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Executive Summary  
Introduction 
1 This report reviews the costs and benefits of external quality assurance (QA) of 
teaching and learning in higher education institutions (HEIs) in England. The 
report focuses particularly on the new Institutional Audit process, run by the 
Quality Assurance Agency (QAA) and the other QA processes in health, 
teacher training, medical education, and in other disciplines subject to 
professional body review, such as engineering, business and law.  
2 While everyone accepts the value of an external check on standards and 
quality in higher education, there has been concern about the combined costs 
of all these external reviews on the sector, and the potentially negative 
consequences of diversion of academic effort into compliance activity. 
3 Overall, we find that the specific measurable costs for HEIs of dealing with all 
external QA reviews are now approximately £40m a year. This represents a 
significant reduction from the position three-to-four years ago, and it is not a 
large sum in relation to the importance of UK higher education, and the 
numbers of students gaining qualifications each year. However, it is equivalent 
to four full-time senior staff (professors or senior administrators) at each of the 
130 English universities and colleges. There are also unknown costs of lost 
opportunity and suppression of innovation in higher education. 
4 Planned changes will reduce this cost as the sector moves into the next six-
year phase of academic quality assurance. Based on our review of costs and 
benefits, we propose a further streamlining of the new process of Institutional 
Audit. Taken together, these changes will lead to an annual cost to HEIs of 
approximately £30m from 2006/07. We have also identified areas where 
collaboration between the QA agencies could reduce costs further without loss 
of important accountability or other benefits.  
Scope and methodology of study 
5 More than 50 bodies are involved in reviewing quality and standards in 
universities and colleges, and each institution interacts with a different 
combination of these depending on the range of programmes it offers. We have 
investigated the impact of this external QA activity (benefits and costs) at a 
sample of 12 HEIs chosen to cover the range of types of institution and of 
experience with QA in the sector. We spent approximately two days in each 
institution meeting staff involved in QA, and students, and building up a picture 
of the effort institutions have to make preparing for and managing external QA 
visits and reviews. 
6 The purpose of the study was to provide evidence to support future policy. It is 
convenient to categorise our findings into two broad areas of academic and 
professional QA. 
7 Academic QA review processes fall under the Quality Assurance Framework 
(QAF), which consists of QAA Institutional Audit plus the new public information 
requirements known as Teaching Quality Information (TQI)/National Student 
Survey (NSS). The arrangements are in a transitional phase, but are essentially 
the same for all HEIs in England and Northern Ireland. We have provided 
detailed evidence on the way the arrangements work in practice, plus costs and 
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benefits of each part of the QAF, now, and in a forecast ‘future steady state’. 
These findings support the work of the QAF Review Group, chaired by Dame 
Sandra Burslem. 
8 In the area we have called professional QA, there are a number of different 
processes and greater variation in experience across the 12 institutions. For 
example, we were able to review six institutions’ experience with Ofsted (Office 
for Standards in Education) inspection of Initial Teacher Training; two of our 
sample institutions had medical schools reviewed by the General Medical 
Council; six had experienced the new Major Review in health, and a further two 
had other health reviews; three had further education (FE) provision reviewed 
by Ofsted and the Adult Learning Inspectorate; 10 had reviews by statutory or 
professional bodies – ranging in number from two at one institution to 62 at the 
‘most-reviewed’. Given this much more diversified picture, we are able to 
provide a less comprehensive view of the way these arrangements work, but 
we have reviewed costs and benefits of each main QA programme, now, and in 
a forecast future steady state. 
Purpose and benefits of external QA review 
9 The main purpose of the academic QA arrangements under the QAF is to 
assure the quality and standards of UK higher education awards so that 
students, employers and society can be confident about the value of a UK 
degree. There is an important dimension of providing public information for 
prospective students and others, and also of protecting the international 
reputation and attractiveness of UK higher education. 
10 The main purpose of the professional QA arrangements in the more vocational 
subjects (medicine, health, teacher training, engineering etc) is to ensure that 
graduates who enter those professions are able to practise safely and 
competently, and there is therefore a strong element of public protection in 
professional QA. 
11 These are important benefits for the nation, and having this external review and 
accountability also helps to protect the autonomy of HEIs. More directly, HEIs 
gain benefits from external review which helps them to test and benchmark 
their own processes; it helps quality enhancement; it helps to disseminate good 
practice; it supports and encourages staff development; and it provides a focus 
for academic dialogue around the improvement of the student experience. 
12 We discuss and review all these benefits in the report, but we cannot put a 
value on them in the same way that we measure the costs of achieving them.    
Costs of external QA review 
13 The specific cost of this external review for the English higher education sector 
is approximately £40m a year. This is the full economic cost of work done by 
HEIs directly to prepare for external reviews through such activity as drafting 
self-evaluation documents; briefing staff and students; preparing background 
documents; and holding meetings with review teams.   
14 The costs incurred by HEIs in responding to the main review processes are 
shown in table A. 
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Table A: Current HEI costs of external review on an annualised basis  
 
 Average per 
HEI  £000s 
England 
£m 
Academic QA (transition phase)   
Institutional Audit 69 9.0 
DATs as part of audit 52 6.7 
Developmental Engagements 14 1.8 
Foundation degree reviews 2 0.25 
Provision of auditors for QAA 10 1.3 
Total academic QA (QAF) 147  19.1 
   
Professional QA   
Ofsted inspection of ITT - 3.8 
GMC review of medicine - 1.5 
Review of health provision - 4.4 
Inspection of FE  - 1.6 
Inspection by PSRBs (excl. health) - 9.9 
Total professional QA 163 21.2 
Total cost of external QA 310 40.3 
 
Note: where HEIs do not all have the same processes, the £000s figure per HEI is not 
meaningful, and is not included. Full details are in tables 2 and 4.  
15 The central costs, that is the costs of inspection incurred by the publicly funded 
agencies which specify or carry out these external reviews (such as Ofsted, 
Skills for Health, Adult Learning Inspectorate and QAA), are in the region of 
£10m per annum.  
Academic QA in the transitional phase of the QAF  
16 Institutions welcome the new Institutional Audit which is a less intrusive, and 
much less costly, process than the former combination of institutional and 
Subject Review. Institutional Audit is a peer review process, focused on an 
institution’s central management and QA systems, which has the aim of 
ensuring that institutions are managing their own quality effectively, rather than 
of making direct observations on teaching and learning. There is strong student 
involvement in Institutional Audit, which can be very productive. 
17 We provide a detailed commentary in chapter 3 on the way Institutional Audit is 
working in practice. In general, this is satisfactory, but there are a few areas 
where there is scope to improve the process. The largest of these is in respect 
of Discipline Audit Trails (DATs) within the audit. These were introduced as a 
compromise in audits to retain a subject element, as well as an opportunity for 
QAA review teams to test processes are working at the subject level. 
18 We find that DATs are the least satisfactory part of audit. They are very costly 
for institutions, and their focus on subject specialities can change the focus of 
the audit in a way which runs counter to its main purpose. They also provide 
the greatest opportunities and incentives for focus on detail and the associated 
costly over-preparation by institutions. For these reasons we believe that DATs 
should cease in their present form, and that QAA should use other forms of 
audit trails. This should significantly reduce the costs of audit for individual HEIs 
and save over £1m centrally. 
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19 TQI/NSS are still in a developmental phase and no direct benefits have yet 
been delivered. It seems probable that they will add approximately £3m per 
annum to the sector’s costs of academic QA (that is the costs incurred by 
HEIs). There is widespread scepticism amongst institutions as to whether the 
benefits will justify these extra costs. 
Assessment 
20 Overall, it is clear that there has been a very significant reduction in the costs of 
QA for the sector since this issue was first raised in 2000. All the main 
government-funded QA processes we have reviewed have a specific purpose 
and deliver benefits. Several of them have recently been streamlined or are 
currently in a process of transition which will lead to a further reduction in costs. 
21 There is therefore no longer evidence of major problems associated with 
unreasonable costs of QA for HEIs across the sector. However, the impact can 
still be high for some departments and institutions, notably small departments 
and institutions, and for those which have a wide spread of vocational 
programmes. In line with the principles for regulation of quality we propose in 
chapter 6, it is still important to seek ways to reduce the costs of external QA 
where this can be done with no loss of benefits or necessary accountability. 
22 In this context, we note that there are still a number of uncoordinated review 
regimes, and that new review processes can still be added without a clear 
business case in place. The perceived data requirements of inspecting 
agencies are often onerous, especially when HEIs perceive that a large amount 
of web-based material has to be printed out and assembled in one room for 
review teams, or when new material has to be created by reformatting existing 
documentation. 
23 We have identified that this is not all the fault of the inspecting agencies. HEIs 
do not always respond as strategically as they could to external review. Many 
do more than is required (sometimes this is justified by additional benefits, but 
sometimes it is unplanned – so called ‘gold-plating’). This can be encouraged 
by poorly designed review processes, or ambiguous guidance, and by 
occasional members of review teams who over-step what is required or try to 
‘test HEIs out’.  
24 The result of all these factors is that there is still a significant unnecessary cost 
for higher education institutions (albeit much reduced in recent years). This 
must weaken HEIs’ effectiveness in teaching and research, and in other policy 
objectives such as widening participation and knowledge transfer. There are 
also unquantifiable costs related to the diversion of academic staff time, and 
the danger of the creation of a culture which is cautious about innovation, or 
sees quality as about satisfying external agencies, rather than as an intrinsic 
academic objective. 
25 The policy aim must therefore be to achieve a better balance of costs and 
benefits, and to move (as basic standards are assured) to more intelligent and 
developmental review regimes. We believe the agencies can help this by fine-
tuning their own processes and by harmonising and sharing requirements with 
each other, thus avoiding multiple publicly-funded inspections of the same 
departments or disciplines. HEIs can also do more to respond strategically, 
rather than on an ad-hoc basis to external review. Some of them need to 
become more confident and self-critical, and to design their own internal 
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processes such that they do not need to make costly special preparations when 
reviewing agencies visit. Some examples of this good practice already exist, 
and they could be better disseminated in the sector. We identify some areas 
where we would like to see more work to facilitate and encourage this further 
collaboration and maturing of the processes, and of institutions’ responses to 
them. 
 
Future steady state costs of review 
26 The costs of academic QA are already due to reduce at the end of the 
transition period, as a result of the move to a six-year cycle. If our 
recommendations on Institutional Audit are accepted, and our assumptions 
about the evolution of the other processes are right, there will be a further 
significant reduction in the total annual costs for institutions which will come 
down to an average of £77,000 per institution (£10.0m for the whole sector) for 
academic QA and to £151,000 (£19.7m for the whole sector) for professional 
QA. This is shown in table B. 
 
Table B: Forecast future steady state costs of external review on an 
annualised basis  
 
 Average per 
HEI  £000s 
England 
£m 
Academic QA QAF (6-year cycle)   
Institutional Audit 32 4.2 
Developmental work 6 0.76 
Provision of auditors for QAA 5 0.67 
Collaborative audit 10 1.3 
TQI/NSS 24 3.1 
Total academic QA (QAF) 77  10.0 
   
Professional QA   
Ofsted inspection of ITT - 3.0 
GMC review of medicine - 1.3 
Review of health provision - 4.2 
Inspection of FE in HE - 1.3 
Inspection by PSRBs (excl. health) - 9.9 
Total professional QA 151 19.7 
Total cost of external QA 228 29.7 
 
Note: the ‘average’ figure for costs of collaborative audit is actually a composite of 
zero for most HEIs, and £37,000 for the 37 HEIs which will have a collaborative audit. 
The total academic QA costs per HEI therefore vary between £61,000 (without 
collaborative audit) and £98,000 (with collaborative audit). In other cases where HEIs 
have (even wider) variations in processes, we have not included an average cost per 
HEI. Full details are in Tables 6 and 7.  
 
27 There should also be some reduction in the central costs of the agencies as 
their effort in terms of inspection days is reduced. 
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1 Introduction  
1.1. This is the report on our study of the impact of external quality assurance 
(QA) activity in higher education. 
 
Purpose of the study 
1.2. The study had two high-level objectives: 
 
• to review the costs and impacts of the higher education Quality 
Assurance Framework (the combination of Institutional Audit; 
implementation of the Academic Infrastructure in institutions; and the 
information requirements for higher education institutions) 
• to review the costs and impacts of all externally driven QA activity in 
higher education. This is to support the Department for Education and 
Skills (DfES) in their requirement to report to the Inspection sub-
committee of the Commons Committee for Public Services and 
Expenditure [PSX(I)]. 
1.3. The study was guided by two steering groups; the Quality Assurance 
Framework Review Group, chaired by Dame Sandra Burslem, and a DfES 
project group, chaired by Jane Tory.  
1.4. The study was an England-based one, and the outcomes should also be 
relevant to Northern Ireland. There are significant differences in the QA 
regimes in Scotland (especially), and in Wales. 
 
Methodology and evidence 
1.5. The evidence in this report relates to the impact of external review of QA 
(‘inspection’) on higher education institutions (HEIs). We have investigated 
benefits, costs and other impacts of this activity at the 12 HEIs listed 
below. All of these institutions have experienced a new-style Institutional 
Audit by the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA), and they were chosen to 
represent a range of types of institution, and of experiences with external 
QA, including, in particular, review of medical education, health 
professions, and teacher training education. We wish to acknowledge the 
assistance provided to our work by these institutions. 
 
Bath Spa University College 
University of Birmingham 
University of Bradford 
University of Cambridge 
Cumbria Institute of the Arts 
University of Essex  
University of Greenwich  
Nottingham Trent University 
University of Portsmouth 
College of St Mark & St John  
Trinity College of Music 
University of Wolverhampton 
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1.6. Our evidence on the costs of external review of QA at each institution was 
built up on a full economic cost basis, that is to say using the same 
Transparent Approach to Costing (TRAC) principles that are used to 
calculate the full costs of research or teaching in institutions1. 
1.7. In each institution, we had discussions with a range of institutional 
representatives (see chapter 3) and we collected other evidence. The 
large number of staff we met enabled us to test and triangulate this 
evidence both within and across institutions. We believe that, collectively, 
this body of evidence provides a robust basis for drawing policy 
conclusions. 
1.8. The student perspective is important to this study, and we have had 
discussions with student representatives at the majority of case study 
institutions, and with the National Union of Students.  
1.9. We had discussions with all the main agencies which commission or 
undertake QA review of provision in higher education. The publicly-funded 
agencies include the Higher Education Funding Council for England 
(HEFCE), Universities UK, the Standing Conference of Principals (SCOP), 
QAA, Ofsted, Skills for Health, the Teacher Training Agency (TTA), and 
the Adult Learning Inspectorate. We also had discussions with a number 
of professional statutory and regulatory Bodies which review HEIs, 
including the General Medical Council (GMC), the Association of Masters 
in Business Administration (AMBA), the Law Society, the Institution of 
Electrical Engineers, and the General Social Care Council. 
1.10. We are grateful to all these organisations for their helpful contributions to 
our work.   
 
Scope of this report 
1.11. QA in higher education is complex, and external review arrangements 
have been in a state of change for a decade. This report does not attempt 
to provide a definitive review of the subject. Its purpose is to provide 
robust evidence on the benefits, costs and effectiveness of the QA 
arrangements, as they currently exist, and to forecast the costs for the 
sector, in the near future, as a basis for consideration of future policy.  
1.12. A number of wider contextual factors may also affect the environment for 
QA in the medium term. These were discussed by the two steering 
groups, but not considered in detail in this report. It may be appropriate to 
conduct a further review at a later date when the outcome of these 
changes is clearer.   
1.13. This report is in five main sections which cover: 
 
• a summary of the background to the review and a description of 
current QA arrangements (chapter 2) 
• evidence on the impact of the Quality Assurance Framework and 
academic QA by the QAA (chapter 3) 
• the costs of academic QA (chapter 4) 
• the evidence on the impact and cost of all other professional QA 
review activities in higher education (chapter 5) 
• our conclusions and comments on the broader issues of 
cost/benefit and future arrangements (chapter 6). 
                                                
1 Further details in chapter 4. 
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2 Background: QA in Higher Education 
2.1. This chapter summarises the main elements of the background to this 
review. The chapter covers: 
• scope and definitions 
• evolution of quality assurance in higher education 
• better regulation and the burdens on HEIs 
• the new Quality Assurance Framework 
• the academic infrastructure and institutional QA processes 
• other external review of QA 
• purposes and benefits of external quality assurance. 
2.2. This chapter draws upon a number of sources of information, but we 
would particularly like to acknowledge the recent book by Roger Brown2 
which is a readable and comprehensive account of the UK experience in 
QA from 1992 to 2003.  
 
 
Scope and definitions 
2.3. This report is about external quality assurance activity and its impact on 
higher education. As Roger Brown points out, quality assurance is 
essentially a management (internal) activity, and strictly, we should 
probably refer to external quality monitoring, or external quality evaluation. 
However, QA is a well-understood term in this connection, and is in our 
terms of reference. 
2.4. QA can be distinguished from quality enhancement (QE), and the 
relationship here has been well illustrated by Robin Middlehurst3 who 
notes that there is a natural hierarchy or progression: 
• quality objectives or standards 
• quality control 
• quality assurance 
• quality enhancement 
• quality transformation. 
2.5. Thus quality assurance builds upon quality objectives and quality control, 
and may in turn contribute to quality enhancement. 
2.6. External QA activity in the UK is of three main types which we define as 
follows: 
• assessment (measurement of outputs – such as observing teaching 
and sampling the student experience) 
• audit (review of the management processes an institution has 
established to assure the quality of its outputs)  
• accreditation (approval of an institution as suitable to make awards, 
or a programme or module as meriting professional recognition). 
                                                
2 Brown, R ‘Quality Assurance in Higher Education’, RoutledgeFalmer, 2004  
3 Middlehurst, R ‘Enhancing Quality in Repositioning Higher Education’, SRHE, 1997 
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2.7. One other key term is validation. This is when an institution determines 
whether a programme of study, whether or not delivered within the 
institution, is fit to lead to one of the institution’s awards. One form of this 
occurs when a university validates the degrees gained by students 
studying at a partner institution which does not itself have degree 
awarding powers.  
2.8. The term ‘inspection’ is used as a generic term in the remit of the PSX(I), 
and in our terms of reference. When we use it in this report, it does not 
imply any judgement about the nature of a particular QA process, or the 
organisation carrying it out.  
2.9. We are evaluating two distinct, but related, areas of external QA review in 
higher education. The first is what we describe as ‘academic QA’, i.e. the 
activity by the QAA which is about assuring the standard of academic 
qualifications and programmes across the institution (often described as 
‘fitness for award’). This is covered in chapters 3 and 4. The second area, 
which we have called ‘professional QA’, includes the activity of other 
agencies concerned with those more vocational or contract-funded higher 
education programmes which lead to a professional qualification as well 
as an academic award (such as law, medicine, teaching, health 
professions and engineering) and also FE provision in HEIs4. The 
additional external review in these areas is covered in chapter 5.  
 
 
Evolution of academic quality assurance in higher education 
 
Policy evolution 
2.10. External quality assurance in UK higher education has had a relatively 
turbulent history in recent years.  
2.11. Prior to the 1990s, the two sides of the binary line had different traditions 
of QA. 
2.12. The universities, as autonomous chartered bodies, were not subject to any 
comprehensive external review of their academic provision (apart from the 
work of external examiners). However, the Committee of Vice-Chancellors 
and Principals (CVCP) created an Academic Audit Unit in 1990 to 
scrutinise institutions’ quality control systems. 
2.13. By contrast, the polytechnics and colleges, which made up the public 
sector of higher education, were subject to external validation by the 
Council for National Academic Awards (CNAA) which awarded degrees in 
that sector. Over time, CNAA moved to accrediting mature institutions to 
make academic awards. The Business and Technology Education Council 
(BTEC) fulfilled an equivalent role in respect of vocational awards. These 
HEIs were also subject to inspection by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate (HMI) 
– which (for a brief period) informed the allocation of funding. 
2.14. Following the creation of the unified sector by the Further and Higher 
Education Act 1992, a two-part approach to external QA was introduced 
with ‘subject assessment’ by the funding councils, and ‘systems audit’ by 
the Higher Education Quality Council (HEQC). The culture of the two 
differed. While assessment was externally imposed by the funding 
                                                
4 This distinction between academic and professional QA is of course a simplification of a more 
complex situation, but it is convenient to have a single word to use in this report.  
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councils as a condition of funding, audit was a sector-owned process 
funded by subscriptions paid by HEIs.   
2.15. In 1997, the QAA was created (taking over both functions and some of the 
staff who formerly managed them). Also in 1997, the Dearing Committee 
of Inquiry into Higher Education reported a number of recommendations 
on QA which provided the basis for the academic infrastructure (described 
below). 
2.16. QAA began its work with a remit from HEFCE to complete HEFCE’s 
programme of Subject Review and with a public standpoint of making 
academic teachers more ‘professionally accountable’. Concerns about the 
dual process remained, and the PA Consulting report to HEFCE in 2000 
showed the costs of Subject Review to the sector were at least £30m 
annually5. The Government announced the abandonment of universal 
Subject Review early in 2001. HEFCE consulted on a revised method for 
quality assurance of teaching and learning later that year6. 
2.17. This consultation document (HEFCE 01/45) set out objectives for QA (see 
below). It also defined some principles for the new approach which were: 
• meeting public information needs 
• recognising the responsibility of HEIs for their own systems of QA 
• lightness of touch. 
2.18. This essentially defined the policy for the current arrangements. The 
revised Institutional Audit and the new public information requirements 
(through TQI/NSS) form an interdependent package, which permitted the 
relaxation of the requirements for comprehensive Subject Review. 
2.19. Based on this, QAA developed a new audit-based approach which was 
approved in 2002, and the first audits began in 2003. An important new 
emphasis was on the quality of the student experience and the 
involvement of students in Institutional Audit. The TQI (public information) 
element is still being developed. This regime constitutes the Quality 
Assurance Framework, and is reviewed in chapter 3.  
 
Review activity 
2.20. While these changes were going on at the national policy level, institutions 
and academics experienced a continuing (albeit frequently changing) 
regime of external QA. There have been two main streams to this in terms 
of academic QA – assessment and audit. 
2.21. The assessment stream began as a result of the government 
requirement to HEFCE to ensure that subject level assessments were 
carried out which were capable of informing funding. HEFCE designed a 
process which included self-assessment by institutions, followed by peer 
reviewer visits to institutions to confirm or amend their self-assessments. 
Assessment was done in 15 subjects, leading to a result of excellent, 
satisfactory or unsatisfactory. Approximately 500 (out of 1,000) institutional 
subject areas were visited between 1992 and 1995. The remainder were 
confirmed as satisfactory on the basis of the self-assessment. 
2.22. In the mid 1990s, the regime was changed by HEFCE. It became more 
                                                
5 ‘Better Accountability for Higher Education’ PA Consulting (HEFCE 00/36). 
6  ‘Quality assurance in Higher Education’  HEFCE 01/45 (Consultation) 
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about ‘market information’, and the grading system had scores of 1-4 
awarded in six areas, so that provision which fully met the institution’s 
objectives in all these areas scored 24. This regime was taken over by 
QAA in 1997 and continued until 2001, known as Subject Review.   
2.23. The audit stream was about reviewing institutional management and QA 
processes. When the two sectors were unified, the HEQC took over the 
audit role and published reports on the lessons learned from audit. Audit 
was extended to cover collaborative provision (validation audits) and 
overseas provision (overseas audits). Finally, after all institutions had been 
audited (around 1996), HEQC undertook a programme of continuation 
audits, which were intended to be less burdensome, drawing on internal 
processes and evidence already available within institutions.   
 
 
Better regulation and the burdens on HEIs 
2.24. The Better Regulation Task Force (BRTF) produced a first report with its 
principles of better regulation in 1998. In 2002, the BRTF published a 
report on higher education7 with a chapter on QA which was critical of the 
burdens and lack of co-ordination of external inspection activities.  
2.25. Some of the evidence for this view was provided by the PA Consulting 
report already mentioned. PA reviewed burdens of accountability and 
found that the costs of a QAA Subject Review were in the region of 
£50,000 at the University of Leeds and in the range of £80,000-180,000 at 
Leeds Metropolitan (partly due to the more complex modular programme 
structure of the new university).  
2.26. A common view in institutions we have visited is that, whatever its 
justification, Subject Review effectively killed all other innovation and 
activity in the department for the whole of the academic year in which it 
took place. The PA report includes a photograph of the paper assembled 
by one department for a Subject Review. This fills most of a reasonable 
sized room, and is not untypical of the preparations that institutions felt 
obliged to make for Subject Review.   
2.27. In July 2003, the Government published its policy on Inspection of Public 
Services. This sets out 10 principles about the purpose, processes, and 
added value of inspection of public services. A new ministerial committee 
– PSX(I) – has been established to oversee this policy. The policy requires 
inspectorates to have regard to value for money – delivering benefits 
commensurate with costs. As part of this, DfES has to assess the full 
costs and benefits of inspection activity in higher education. 
2.28. Within higher education, the Better Regulation Review Group was chaired 
by David VandeLinde. Its remit was to oversee the implementation of the 
recommendations in ‘Easing the Burden’ and to devise a gatekeeper 
mechanism to prevent unnecessary burdens being introduced through 
new initiatives in higher education. The gatekeeper body is the new Higher 
Education Regulation Review Group (HERRG), chaired by Dame Patricia 
Hodgson, which began work in 2004.  
 
 
 
                                                
7 Higher Education: Easing the Burden. BRTF. July 2002 
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The Quality Assurance Framework – QAF 
2.29. The term Quality Assurance Framework describes specific elements of the 
system of external review and information which have replaced the former 
regime of audit and assessment. Policy ownership of the QAF is by QAA, 
Universities UK, SCOP, and HEFCE. The QAF consists of the QAA 
Institutional Audit, plus the TQI. This also implies the expectations of the 
academic infrastructure (discussed below) have been addressed by 
institutions. 
2.30. The QAF was developed through negotiations between the main 
stakeholders and includes some compromise elements (notably the 
inclusion of a continuing subject-related element in Discipline Audit Trails, 
DATs). The system is different in Wales (without Discipline Audit Trails), 
and in Scotland is significantly different from that in both England and 
Wales, having a stronger emphasis on quality enhancement.   
2.31. The QAF is in a transitional phase, and is only partly implemented. The 
main elements are described below. 
 
QAA Institutional Audit  
2.32. Most institutions will perceive the QAA Institutional Audit as the key 
element. The new approach involves a change in philosophy. This 
recognises that the good quality of most provision has been demonstrated, 
and that institutions should have the main responsibility for assessing and 
assuring the quality of their own provision. To do this, they have to 
develop and maintain an appropriate institutional infrastructure, and to 
conduct their own internal assessments or reviews.  
2.33. QAA now has a more limited role in auditing institutional QA systems, and 
the way they are implemented rather than reviewing teaching directly. This 
implies that QAA’s involvement with institutions will be lighter and more 
strategic, and institutions should experience a lower cost of preparing for 
and engaging in QAA visits. It does not imply that institutions will do any 
less work to ensure their own teaching quality. 
2.34. The QAA ‘Handbook for Institutional Audit: England’ sets out the aims and 
process for Institutional Audits, and provides guidance for institutions in 
preparing self-evaluation documents and responding to QAA visits. 
2.35. During the transitional phase, which began in 2002, all institutions will be 
audited within a three-year period, to be followed by a six-year cycle. Audit 
visits are prepared under the guidance of a QAA assistant director and are 
conducted by a team of reviewers selected from a panel retained by QAA. 
A visit normally lasts five days. Reports are published and give a view 
about the confidence that QAA can have in the management of quality at 
the institution. Confidence can be ‘broad’, ‘limited’ or ‘absent’, and QAA 
make associated recommendations to institutions in three categories: 
‘essential’, ‘advisable’, and ‘desirable’. 
2.36. QAA review teams use the DATs as a means to ‘drill down’ to see the way 
that institutional QA systems are working at subject level. Typically, four-
to-six DATs are included in each audit. They require QAA teams to include 
subject specialists and they involve a more detailed level of intervention 
(including reviewers looking at student work). 
2.37. Thematic enquiries, which are much less common, serve a similar function 
and can be in areas of cross-disciplinary interest such as graduate 
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studies. 
2.38. QAA will also be conducting collaborative audits at about 30 institutions 
which have significant collaborative provision. These will take place over 
2005/06 and 2006/07. 
2.39. During the transitional period, some institutions had Developmental 
Engagements (DEs) which were subject-related reviews intended to be 
developmental for institutions with no publication of results by QAA. 
 
Teaching Quality Information and National Student Survey (TQI/NSS) 
2.40. The revised audit process is not considered adequate on its own to satisfy 
the Government’s, and other stakeholders’, requirements for accountability 
and information on teaching quality. It was therefore supplemented by 
some new requirements on institutions to provide information about quality 
and standards. 
2.41. The principles for this were set out in the HEFCE consultation document 
HEFCE 01/45. The idea was to have a set of existing data on quality and 
standards which institutions should draw together, maintain, and make 
available for use by relevant staff for purposes of internal QA. From within 
this, a sub-set of data would be published as an information resource for 
students, employers etc. 
2.42. A task group chaired by Sir Ron Cooke specified the information to be 
included in both the institutional internal data set, and the published data8. 
Subsequently, work has been done to develop a National Student Survey 
(NSS) which took place for the first time in 2005, and to develop the 
templates and systems to enable all HEIs to publish a consistent set of 
information about quality and standards. These arrangements do not 
include health students or practice learning.  
2.43. This part of the QAF is still being developed and implemented, and the 
evidence on its cost and benefits in this report is therefore much less 
definitive than that on Institutional Audit. 
 
 
The Academic Infrastructure and institutional QA processes 
2.44. The Academic Infrastructure has four components, which were 
recommended by Dearing and have been developed and defined by QAA 
in collaboration with the sector. Its purpose is to provide national reference 
points on standards, and to guide institutions’ internal QA processes. The 
four components are: 
• the framework for HE qualifications, which helps the sector to 
define standards for academic awards 
• national benchmark statements, which help to define what 
constitutes degree-level work in different disciplines 
• institutional programme specifications 
• the Code of Practice for the assurance of academic quality and 
standards. 
2.45. The Code of Practice is the most relevant of these for this review, as a 
management tool for institutions. It is a 100-page document described as 
‘an authoritative reference point’ for HEIs as they assure the quality of 
                                                
8  ‘ Information on Quality and Standards in Higher Education’ HEFCE 02/15 
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their own programmes and awards. The Code contains precepts which are 
statements of good practice that QAA will expect to see institutions 
addressing, plus guidance which may help them to do so.  
2.46. In ‘Easing the Burden’, the BRTF recommended that the QAA should 
‘simplify and compress its Code of Practice making it user friendly and 
less prescriptive in tone’. 
2.47. These four elements of the Academic Infrastructure contribute in different 
ways to institutional academic QA, and the way institutions have 
implemented the different elements is one of the factors considered by 
QAA review teams.  
2.48. As part of their own management, all institutions maintain some key 
internal academic quality control and assurance processes. The most 
important processes (which are all covered in the Code) are: 
 
• a process for approval of new courses 
• a process of annual monitoring of programmes and student 
achievement 
• a process of more in-depth periodic review of programmes usually at 
department or discipline level and with an external element 
• a system of external examining which includes external review of 
student work and verification of the comparability of academic 
standards between institutions.  
2.49. The Academic Infrastructure is an important part of the context within 
which Institutional Audit and other external review takes place. While we 
are not reviewing the Academic Infrastructure per se, a valid assessment 
of the costs and benefits of external QA has to take some account of the 
other QA processes already in place in institutions. 
 
 
Other external review of QA 
2.50. In addition to the QAF, there are other external QA processes to which 
institutions are subject. The most important of these are: 
a. The regulations surrounding degree awarding powers and 
university title which are a form of institutional accreditation and 
serve to ensure that institutions which award degrees and use the 
title of university satisfy a number of management, governance and 
quality control criteria. 
b. The funding councils’ processes of institutional monitoring and 
audit. These are not primarily directed at quality of teaching, but they 
take account of institutions’ governance and management and of 
their performance against benchmarks in terms of recruitment, 
retention, and student destinations for example, and so indirectly 
monitor quality of provision. 
c. Review and monitoring by government departments and public 
bodies which contract with HEIs to deliver education (chiefly in 
respect of initial teacher training; health professions; and FE 
provision in HEIs) – see chapter 5. 
d. Review by a wide range of professional and statutory regulatory 
bodies (PSRBs) – see chapter 5. 
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2.51. While the QAA provides the core academic quality review in higher 
education (and for many institutions it is the most significant one), there 
are therefore many other agencies and processes which also review 
aspects of higher education teaching provision.  
 
 
Purposes and benefits of external quality assurance  
2.52. HEFCE consultation 01/45 identified four objectives of quality assurance in 
higher education: 
• to contribute, in conjunction with other mechanisms, to the promotion 
of high quality and standards in teaching and learning 
• to provide students, employers and others with reliable and 
consistent information about quality and standards at each higher 
education institution 
• to ensure that higher education programmes are identified where 
quality or standards are unsatisfactory, as a basis for ensuring rapid 
action to improve them 
• to provide one means of securing accountability for the use of public 
funds received by HEIs. 
2.53. These four objectives were carried forward into the work done by QAA, 
and are reflected in the Handbook for Institutional Audit. There were some 
changes in wording, the most significant of these is the inclusion of the 
concept of enhancement in the first purpose.  
2.54. A commonly-stated fifth purpose or benefit of all these activities is to 
protect the reputation of UK higher education, the employability of UK 
graduates, and the standing of UK awards and professions both in the UK 
and internationally. It could be argued that this flows from the other 
purposes above, but both QAA and members of the two steering groups 
attach importance to these broader benefits and so we have adopted this 
as a fifth purpose in the analysis in this report. 
 
Evaluation framework 
2.55. In summary, the five purposes of external review of QA can be described 
as: 
• to promote quality 
• to provide public information 
• to ensure minimum standards, and to protect the public 
• to provide accountability 
• to protect and enhance the reputation of UK higher education. 
2.56. Of course, these five purposes are not all independent of each other, but 
neither are they in conflict. Three of them (accountability, minimum 
standards, and promotion of quality) might be thought of as lying along an 
axis, while the other two (information and the reputation of UK higher 
education) are of a different kind. This is illustrated in figure 1 at the end of 
this chapter. 
2.57. Generally, review for accountability purposes could be expected to be a 
relatively standardised process, with little scope for discretion, and the 
outcome would be a simple Yes/No. This type of inspection is necessary 
      
11  
where public funds are involved, but offers little added value and should 
therefore be at the minimum level of intrusiveness possible. 
2.58. At the other end of the spectrum, much quality enhancement in higher 
education is not about standardisation or judgements. It is about 
exploration, innovation, and an element of uncertainty and risk. These may 
be inhibited by the type of inspection that is focused on accountability. 
 
Figure 1: Purposes of external QA in higher education 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.59. Many of the review processes discussed in this report combine an element 
of accountability with an element of minimum standards, and most claim 
they also wish to promote quality. However, the relationship between 
these different purposes is clearly complex. We can see how a process 
aimed at accountability might sometimes incorporate the idea of a 
minimum or threshold standard, but it is very difficult to see how it could 
also make a significant contribution to higher standards or quality 
enhancement, since this requires a very different type of relationship 
between the institution and the reviewer (the inappropriateness of the term 
inspection in this area makes the point). 
2.60. Another way of looking at the purposes of these review processes is in 
terms of what they are measuring. We have described the primary QAA 
purpose as academic QA, or ‘fitness for award’. Employers and 
commissioners of contract-funded education are usually interested in 
‘fitness for purpose’ (or ‘fitness for employment’). Professional and 
statutory regulatory bodies are concerned with ‘fitness for practice’. There 
is some overlap between all these purposes, but they are not the same 
and, typically, need different processes to assure their quality. 
2.61. In the area of health professions for example, the issues around quality 
Quality 
Minimum standards 
Accountability 
Reputation of  
UK HE 
 
 
 
Public 
information 
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and minimum standards are commonly articulated in terms of threshold 
standards to achieve the licence to practise and protection of the public. 
Skills for Health also notes the importance of: 
• growth and development of the health-care workforce 
• contribution to a culture of good clinical governance. 
2.62. In a parallel way, a major focus of Ofsted inspection of Initial Teacher 
Training (ITT) has been around the raising of standards in order to 
enhance the professional performance and competence of teachers 
(another example of protection of the public).  
2.63. We illustrate some of the characteristics and benefits of different types of 
review mechanism in figure 2, but this is an illustrative or indicative figure 
only – it is not part of our findings and if readers do not find it helpful, it can 
be ignored. 
2.64. We return to these issues in later chapters. 
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Figure 2: Benefits of external QA processes 
 
Primary purpose Suitable mechanism Examples Main focus/benefits Secondary benefits Comments 
Promotion and 
enhancement of 
high quality 
 
Review by academic peers in 
a non-judgemental framework 
which celebrates good 
practice and does not 
penalise institutions for 
admitting weaknesses 
 
QAA DEs 
QAA Audit 
Major Review 
GMC 
(but also aspects of 
most other 
processes) 
 
• Peer review and 
dialogue 
• HEIs improve quality 
and make innovations  
• Improves student 
experience 
• Benefits beyond HE 
sector 
• Enhances 
performance, 
reputation and 
marketing of all HEIs 
and of UK HE 
 
 
Needs a culture which is 
open and flexible to new 
approaches and looks at 
outcomes more than 
processes 
 
Not a main focus at 
present 
Ensure minimum 
standards by 
identifying weak or 
unsatisfactory 
provision 
 
External inspection and/or 
accreditation against defined 
codes or standards leading to 
publication of outcomes 
and/or sanctions  
 
QAA Audit 
Major Review 
PSRBs 
Ofsted 
 
• Ensures threshold 
standards 
• Public protection (such 
as fitness to practice) 
• Protects student 
experience 
• Stakeholder 
confidence 
• Enhances reputation 
and marketing 
• Supports 
employability and 
UK plc fitness for 
purpose of 
workforce, such as 
NHS 
 
Needs agreed standards 
and equity of approach 
 
Has been the main focus 
of external QA and the 
academic infrastructure to 
date  
Accountability for 
use of public funds 
 
External inspection of 
provision or outcomes 
Ofsted 
FD reviews 
Major Review 
• Government and 
stakeholder 
confidence 
• ensures future 
funding 
• protects HEI 
autonomy 
Also supported by all 
other mechanisms 
Public information 
about quality and 
standards 
 
Standardised publication of 
information on institutional 
provision and standards  
Ofsted  
TQI/NSS 
Major Review  
Some PSRBs  
• Informs student choice 
• Further strengthens 
stakeholder 
confidence 
• May prompt 
improvements 
through competitive 
pressures 
Needs a consistent 
framework and published 
results (but not effective if 
all HEIs get the same 
rating) 
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3 Academic Quality Assurance – Institutional Audit and Related 
Activity 
 
Introduction 
3.1. This chapter presents the evidence on the impact of the Quality Assurance 
Framework (QAF) on HEIs. For most institutions, Institutional Audit is the 
most visible and significant part of the QAF, and of QA more generally. We 
therefore give a fairly full account of the evidence we have collected on the 
impact of Institutional Audit on HEIs. We also review briefly the other parts 
of the QAF and related academic QA: other QAA reviews; the academic 
infrastructure; and the preparations for TQI/NSS.  
3.2. In chapter 4, we discuss the costs of all this academic QA activity. 
3.3. The evidence presented in this chapter draws upon our work at the 12 
case study institutions listed in chapter 1, and on discussions with the 
QAA. To preserve confidentiality, we use a code letter when we use 
specific illustrations from individual institutions and a code number when 
we quote costs. 
3.4. In each case study institution, we collected data and had discussions with 
institutional representatives who normally included: 
• senior managers (vice-chancellors and their senior colleagues) 
• deans or heads of large academic units 
• heads of academic departments and their staff  
• the head of any central QA unit, and staff of this unit 
• finance staff 
• staff in other relevant central roles (academic registrars, directors of 
information services, heads of student support etc) 
• students. 
3.5. The departments visited included a range of disciplines which had recently 
been subject to different types of external QA, and some which had not. 
Many of the academics we met also had experience of QA from previous 
institutions; from their work as external examiners in other institutions; or 
from working on QAA audit teams. This added richness to our sample.  
3.6. Our findings are therefore based on some hard data on activity and costs, 
collected on a consistent basis across 12 institutions and many academic 
departments, and on hundreds of conversations and comments covering a 
spectrum of experience and opinion about the value and costs of external 
QA. We have synthesised this qualitative information, to derive what we 
believe is a fair and representative overall body of evidence. This is based 
on what institutions have told us, but it is not just an aggregation of 
institutional comments – we have used our professional judgement to 
interpret and extrapolate, and we have not included views which we felt 
were particular to one individual or circumstance, or not relevant to the 
wider remit of the study.  
 
QAA – objectives, processes and costs 
3.7. The mission of the QAA is to safeguard the public interest in sound 
standards of higher education qualifications, and to encourage continuous 
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improvement in the management of the quality of higher education. The 
purposes which QAA has defined for Institutional Audit were covered in 
chapter 2. 
3.8. The background to the establishment of QAA was also outlined in chapter 
2. The QAA was established in 1997, taking over roles previously held by 
HEQC and the funding councils. It is a private company limited by 
guarantee, and a registered charity. The members are the representative 
bodies of the heads of HEIs in the four countries of the UK. The agency is 
funded approximately 30% by institutional subscription, and 70% by 
contracts from the HE funding bodies and Government. 
3.9. QAA’s annual turnover is approximately £10m. It employs about 130 staff. 
It retains a pool of approximately 300 auditors drawn from UK academics. 
They are trained by QAA and are deployed on Institutional Audit and other 
related functions. Individual reviewers are paid by QAA, but their 
institutions provide their services without direct recompense. 
 
Institutional Audit during 2003/04  
3.10. The programme of Institutional Audits began in January 2003. The 
overwhelming majority of HEIs received a judgement of broad confidence, 
although usually with some recommendations. The whole sector in 
England will have been audited by the end of 2005. 
3.11. All 12 of our case study institutions have experienced an Institutional 
Audit. The earliest audit in our sample was at Cumbria Institute in March 
2003, and the most recent at Greenwich in June 2004. The number of 
DATs varied from one at Trinity College of Music to six at Birmingham, 
Bradford and Cambridge. Two institutions (Cambridge and 
Wolverhampton) had also experienced a thematic enquiry. 
3.12. Several had also experienced other QAA events in this period:  
• Developmental Engagements  
• foundation degree reviews 
• reviews of overseas provision.  
 
   QAA’s costs of review  
3.13. QAA provided information on the average cost of its review activities for 
2004/05 (budget costs) as follows.  
Table (i): QAA’s costs of review activity 
 
Total costs of QAA review activity £3.7m 
QAA costs of individual reviews: 
   Developmental Engagement 
   Foundation degree 
   Institutional Review (Wales) 
   Major Review (health) 
   Institutional Audit (with DATs) 
 
£5,600 
£10,800 
£18,600 
£19,400 
£23,400 
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3.14. These costs are averages. The costs of an Institutional Audit for example 
vary from around £12,000 for a very small institution, to around £27,000 
for a large one. The main cause of variation is the size of the review team, 
which varies from four to seven auditors, but location will also be a factor. 
3.15. For 2004/05, QAA budgeted the following numbers of reviews relevant to 
this study: 
• 47 Institutional Audits 
• 69 foundation degree reviews 
• 32 Major Reviews 
• two collaborative audits 
• one overseas audit (involving five HEIs). 
 
3.16. QAA does not have specific information on the cost of DATs, but it seems 
a reasonable assumption that DATs add one member on average to the 
size of the review team and approximately £3,000 to the cost of an 
Institutional Audit for the QAA9.   
 
 
Institutional Audit  
3.17. In this section on Institutional Audit, we cover: 
• the context we found in institutions 
• headline views on Institutional Audit 
• preparation for audit 
• self-evaluation and documentation 
• DATs 
• the audit visit and review team 
• outcomes and benefits 
• student involvement. 
 
Recent history and context for the evidence 
3.18. We found universal acceptance that some form of external inspection is 
necessary for public accountability, and also that it delivers significant 
benefits to institutions (as well as being required by other stakeholders). 
No one argued that the principle of Institutional Audit by the QAA was 
inappropriate.  
3.19. It is also widely acknowledged that the past QA processes had a 
necessary and beneficial effect in establishing and demonstrating a 
consistently good level of quality across the sector, in maintaining the 
reputation of the UK’s higher education, and in helping many institutions to 
mature in terms of academic quality assurance. 
3.20. However, the past processes are seen as having been unduly 
burdensome and are perceived to have been conducted in a way which 
was designed to ‘catch institutions out’ rather than to encourage openness 
and dialogue. One institutional manager commented that:  
 
                                                
9 Each DAT typically takes a half-day within the audit visit and involves two members of the review 
team. 
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‘These processes were based on the false premise that something is wrong which 
cannot be corrected through partnership and collaboration.’ 
 
3.21. This approach led to an element of what institutions perceived as ‘punitive 
inspection’, which in turn encouraged an adversarial atmosphere in which 
a review was something to be ‘survived’ (and reviewers to be out-witted) 
rather than an opportunity for learning and reflection. 
3.22. This negative view in institutions focuses chiefly around two main 
concerns: the excessive volume of paper and preparations required by 
review bodies, and the undue volume of multiple inspection of the same 
provision, often by different agencies with no co-ordination between them. 
We found ample evidence to support both these complaints (which were 
also noted in the PA and BRTF reports we have already described).  
3.23. As is well known, Subject Review could lead to a huge volume of paper 
being produced (most of which could never be used), and to massive 
disruption to academic work in the departments where it occurred. This 
also had serious impact on strategic developments at institutional level. To 
illustrate this burden, one small social sciences department told us that it 
had lost the equivalent of four research years; one of our larger case study 
institutions had experienced 18 Subject Reviews between 1999 and 2002 
with consequent planning blight and delay to necessary institutional 
development; at a large university 99 modern languages teaching 
sessions had been observed as part of a single Subject Review. 
3.24. The second common complaint was the lack of harmonisation of data 
requirements - or the inability of the different agencies to trust each other. 
It has been common for two or more agencies to visit the same academic 
department, reviewing the same small number of staff, and the same 
common management and QA processes, but each being unwilling to rely 
on the documentation produced for the others. A number of the 
departments we visited had experienced three or even four different 
reviews within the space of the past three-to-four years, and some types of 
review can appear to be almost permanent (the education school in one 
institution was about to have its third Ofsted visit of the year at the time of 
our visit).  
3.25. While they may reflect past processes, these perceptions were strong in 
the memory of many staff we met, and any streamlining of QA review 
processes will take some time to be fully perceived. 
3.26. However, it is important to acknowledge that there were significant 
developmental benefits in both Ofsted inspection and Subject Review, 
despite these tensions. For many academics, doing well in these reviews 
was a matter of great pride and importance, and thus became a strong 
motivator for improvement in institutions, which they readily 
acknowledged. 
 
Views on Institutional Audit 
3.27. Against this background, there is a widespread welcome for Institutional 
Audit as a more mature and less-intrusive process, which looks at 
institutional management and QA processes rather than directly at primary 
evidence such as teaching or student work. Institutional Audit is often 
described as a ‘civilised and appropriate’ mechanism, a ‘real peer review’, 
and there is praise for the good relationships that QAA assistant directors 
are establishing with institutions.  
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‘It is valuable to have a professional and supportive external review and the 
relationship with QAA is now very satisfactory – a good relationship with the 
assistant director; good dialogue before the audit; respected and knowledgeable 
auditors; an efficient and helpful secretary; and overall an experience which added 
value rather than being seen as narrowly punitive or ‘trying to find fault’ as in some 
previous experiences.’ [C]  
 
‘Any body spending public money must be reviewed. It is important to know the 
standing of qualifications – for staff, for students, and for UK HE. We are positive 
about peer review and the change from Subject Review to Institutional Audit. This 
has opened up closed parts of the university and given levers for improving the 
student experience. It can also help with spreading good practice and consistency 
of the student experience.’ [G]  
 
3.28. One institution commented that the change to Institutional Audit has 
shifted the balance of effort from the schools to the centre of the university 
– this is probably welcome and appropriate.   
3.29. Another benefit is that:  
‘The periodic nature of Institutional Audit has created windows of opportunity for 
institutions to reflect and advance their processes – under Subject Review there 
was no year when QAA were not in the institution and no chance to do this.’ [M] 
 
3.30. There are also less positive views. Many relate to specific aspects of the 
way audit has been implemented, which we discuss later in this chapter. 
3.31. Three more general criticisms were regularly made, which we believe are 
of general importance. 
3.32. First, while Institutional Audit is greatly welcomed, it is ‘still a regulatory 
process with risks associated’, and institutions regret that it is not a more 
developmental and supportive process. Many of those we met would like 
to see a ‘much more developmental’ approach in which quality 
enhancement was a much higher priority. While it is probably too early to 
assess the experience in Scotland, many institutions were aware of this 
different approach (which is perceived to be more trusting and more 
developmental) and were attracted by the concept.  
3.33. Second, almost all institutions find the judgement of ‘broad confidence’ 
unsatisfactory as it does not enable them to celebrate any areas of real 
excellence, and it is difficult to explain to overseas students or partners: 
‘The terms are hard to bear for course teams. What does ‘broad confidence’ 
mean? What does it mean to students? … Broad confidence suggests “alright”.’ 
[R] 
‘It’s crucial for governors to get an impression of how the institution’s performing 
…we had to explain that broad confidence is the best you could get.’ [S] 
 
3.34. The third, much broader, criticism is that other parts of the QA landscape 
do not appear to have matured in the same way. Institutions regret that 
other review processes, such as foundation degree reviews (which are not 
part of the QAF) do not appear to fit so comfortably within the new 
approach. And, many are concerned that, while the Institutional Audit 
process has matured, if the other agencies which conduct external reviews 
continue to work to the old paradigm, the overall benefit in terms of 
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reducing burdens for HEIs would be significantly reduced.   
 
‘We welcome Institutional Audit but are concerned at a lack of coherence in the 
QA framework. A framework should make an integrated whole, in which each 
element makes a distinctive contribution to clearly stated objectives.’ [T] 
 
Initial preparation and briefing 
3.35. Institutional preparation for audit typically starts more than a year before 
the date of the audit. It was common for institutions to establish task teams 
or steering groups to review their internal processes (academic 
infrastructure) and to begin early drafting of self-evaluation documents. 
For example, institution S set up a team of 15 people about 18 months 
before the audit was due. In institution J, two staff led preparations and 
wrote the self-evaluation document (SED). They began about 10 months 
before the audit and they established an audit preparation group of about 
10 people who acted as the place for institutional ownership of the 
process.   
3.36. There are a number of informal contacts with QAA during this preparation 
and briefing period and institutions regard these helpful. 
3.37. The first formal contact with QAA is at the preparatory meeting, which is 
attended by the QAA assistant director and normally held several months 
before the audit visit. Most institutions found this a helpful and reassuring 
part of the process which enabled them to clarify (and therefore limit) the 
type of preparations they would have to make for the audit visit. It also 
enabled them to begin to understand the scope and nature of what was 
(for most of our sample) still a new process.  
3.38. However, more than one institution commented that the scope of the audit 
(or of the documentation requested) appeared to change significantly from 
their recollection of the preparatory visit.  
 
‘The relationship with the assistant director was good, but there was no formal 
record of the preparatory meeting and when the team visited they requested 
detailed information about areas which the university understood were not to be 
included. They then focused on these areas to an extent which made much of the 
preparatory work the university had done nugatory. The absence of a chair for the 
review team meant that although the university considered the focus of the review 
was being distorted there was no way to redress this except for the university to 
attempt to do so itself.’ [T] 
 
3.39. This concern was experienced in a similar way by other institutions. In all 
four cases, the uncertainty was around the treatment of collaborative 
provision and this appears to suggest a systematic problem. 
3.40. A few weeks before the visit (the period appears to vary), institutions are 
made aware of the areas to be reviewed as DATs. Views vary about 
whether HEIs were able to negotiate these with the QAA, but most HEIs 
felt the choice was reasonable and not surprising.  
3.41. In one case, the discipline areas initially requested by the QAA were very 
broad (and potentially covered nearly half the whole institutional 
provision). The institution was able to negotiate a sensible reduction in this 
by limiting coverage in one chosen discipline to certain programmes only. 
In order to reduce burdens, QAA does not normally seek DATs in 
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disciplines with other government reviews such as teacher training, 
medicine, and the institutions welcomed this.  
3.42. This was a critical point in the process for most institutions as departments 
to have DATs were now able to begin preparation of SEDs (equally 
importantly, others which might have been put on alert to do so could 
stand down). The preparation time for these departments is limited - which 
is a sensible way to minimise preparation and costs - but this can cause 
problems for institutions if it falls during a holiday period when key 
academics are not available. It can also be problematic for large 
departments who may have to prepare many programme or module boxes 
at short notice. More generally, QAA is ‘blind’ to the calendar, but this can 
cause problems, for example: 
 
Institution G was notified of DATs at the very end of the summer term, and this 
caused stress for staff who would not have expected to be in the institution during 
the short period needed for preparation.      
 
A senior manager in institution R was unable to participate in a family holiday as a 
key preparation time fell during the summer vacation. 
 
The student meeting for DE at institution G was scheduled for the same day as 
student final examinations. 
 
Self-evaluation and documentation 
3.43. QAA stresses that self-evaluation is an important part of the process of 
Institutional Audit, and if it is well done an institutional self-evaluation will 
deliver much of the benefit of the audit, and the document (SED) will be 
largely reflected in the report of the audit.  
3.44. All the institutions we visited had prepared a SED. Typically, this is (and 
should be) a significant strategic institutional statement, usually presented 
as a bound document of around 50 to 100 pages, with a large number of 
footnotes and references to other documentation. In some cases, the 
institution had created a CD-Rom with web links and special access to the 
institution’s internal documentation so that review team members could 
browse all the background documentation they might want to see. 
3.45. Often, the preparation of the SED was seen as a significant opportunity to 
involve a wide range of staff. For example, institution O produced three 
main drafts of its SED and held a half-day session for all heads of 
departments to review one of these.   
3.46. The tone and value of SEDs varied. A (slightly cynical) view is that this is a 
document that presents the institution in the best light, and ‘we will only 
reveal weaknesses that we wish to’ (with the unspoken implication that not 
much was learnt from it).  
 
‘The SED creates a lot of work and does not enhance quality.’  
 
However, several SEDs we saw went further than this, and the institutions 
gained correspondingly more benefit.  
3.47. Three institutions in our sample stood out by writing a genuinely self-
critical SED. This was perhaps a risk, but the QAA team responded to this 
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in the right spirit, and as a result the audit had more of a developmental 
element and was helpful to the institutions. One now uses this SED as a 
staff development and staff induction tool.  
3.48. Practice on preparing documentation varies. Under Subject Review it was 
normal to have a large room full of box files (often many hundreds of 
boxes) containing course and module documentation which review teams 
wish to look through when they are following audit trails. All case study 
institutions agreed that under Institutional Audit, the need for this paper 
bank is reduced, but most had still created base rooms and module boxes. 
The need for these is often focused around the DATs. 
3.49. This need was reinforced by some ambiguity about the requirements 
(which were clearly interpreted differently by different institutions), and, 
unfortunately, by a few reviewers not accepting electronic access.  
 
‘Institution S was asked to print out module boxes for 300 modules (despite the 
fact that all this data was available electronically), although only 10 were looked at 
by the reviewers. This resulted in a trailer load of paper being dragged around the 
ring road by a senior academic and a senior administrator.’ [S]   
 
3.50. We have other similar examples. We understand why auditors will 
occasionally wish to have hard copies, but it would reduce stress and 
costs if it was accepted by all reviewing agencies that, as long as 
convenient electronic access is provided, only a limited number of key 
documents had to be produced in hard copy. One institution made the 
good point that it would force institutions to improve their own internal 
communications to academic staff if QAA reviewers were to adopt a policy 
of relying on the same internal systems. Institution S has established an 
‘electronic base room’ for its staff for this purpose.  
3.51. The QAA guidance on this in the handbook refers back to the Cooke 
Report (HEFCE 02/15), and QAA talks about, for example, needing to be 
able to see a sample of relevant documentation. There is some scope for 
uncertainty here. 
3.52. One institution was clear that ‘base rooms and module boxes are not 
appropriate to Institutional Audit’ and they had adopted a different 
approach with correspondingly greatly reduced costs and disruption 
(although they had not implemented this in all departments). Two further 
institutions had also adopted this ‘efficient’ approach (C, I and J). 
3.53. Some institutions held full dry runs or mock audits, usually involving 
external participants (often trained QAA reviewers known to the institution) 
who were sometimes paid to participate. Similarly, departments to have 
DATs often had a review by staff from a different department or from other 
HEIs. Access to QAA auditors was particularly valued in this role. One 
institution established a ‘DAT-pack’ made up of senior academics from 
non-DAT departments to provide support (for example, by acting as critical 
readers).    
 
Discipline Audit Trails 
3.54. DATs are included in Institutional Audit as a mechanism to allow reviewers 
to sample the way that the Management and Quality Assurance (M&QA) 
processes are working in practice in a specific discipline area. As already 
noted, institutions typically have about four-to-six DATs. This number 
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depends on institutional size (but only very broadly as the range of student 
numbers at our sample was from 600 to 20,000). Most institutions 
expressed themselves satisfied with the way DATs were selected.  
3.55. DATs are not generally undertaken in disciplines such as health, medicine, 
education, which are already subject to other review processes.  
3.56. QAA includes a subject specialist for the disciplines having DATs in their 
review teams. For practical reasons, this is not necessarily a ‘real peer’ for 
the academics concerned in the sense of someone who is as expert as 
they are. For example, an historian reviewed a theology DAT, and in some 
very specialist disciplines (such as peace studies) it would be very difficult 
for QAA to find a suitable expert reviewer without much greater notice. 
However, this should not be an issue as the purpose of DATs is not to 
replicate Subject Review on a smaller scale. One institution noted that a 
reviewer from a related discipline was very effective in this role. 
3.57. Most departments involved in DATs also prepared a SED. Typically, these 
are shorter and less complex than institutional SEDs, but still represent a 
large effort. The QAA guidance allows institutions not to produce a SED 
for a DAT if there has been an internal periodic review (as defined in the 
Code of Practice) within the previous two years. Few took advantage of 
this dispensation, but we did find two cases (institutions C and J) confident 
enough in at least one department not to replicate work already done for a 
recent previous review. 
3.58. Institutions differed widely in the extent to which DAT preparations were 
devolved to heads of departments; whether central staff were attached to 
assist (in one, exceptional, case, they wrote the department’s SED); and 
how far uniformity of style and cross-institutional exchange and learning 
was or was not required or facilitated. 
3.59. Institution C had specifically seen the implementation of the QAF as an 
opportunity for change and rationalisation of their QA processes and 
documentation. They had centralised responsibility, and standardised their 
internal processes around their understanding of what QAA would require. 
As a result most of their DATs (which were in areas where they had 
already conducted internal reviews) were able to proceed with very little 
additional documentation. 
3.60. Institution J was interesting in that one department (chemistry) had 
recently had an internal review and took the decision to submit this 
documentation to the QAA with the SED consisting only of a two-page 
cover directing reviewers to the existing documents. A second department 
(law) which had had recent changes decided to go for a root and branch 
operation because the head of department felt this would be valuable for 
the department, and they created a base room and programme boxes for 
the DAT. The costs of the DAT in law were, not surprisingly, three times 
the costs in chemistry.    
3.61. In another institution, there was an even more extreme variation with two 
departments spending the equivalent of 10-12 person weeks on 
preparation for their DAT, while another spent more than 120 weeks. 
3.62. Overall, few institutions or departments had the confidence of those at C 
and J. A more typical view of DATs was: 
 
‘The DAT approach did not appear to be light touch for the academics involved. 
The amount of paperwork required shocked them, as did the need for all the 
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paperwork to be filed and available in one place on one day. However, the 
experience on the day of the discussion with the external auditors was felt to be 
helpful professionally. The academics involved did feel the auditors were their peer 
group.’ [consultant’s report on institution G]   
 
3.63. Early in the audit programme, there appears to have been some 
uncertainty (or differing views) among audit teams about what institutions 
were required to produce, and also some difference in the guidelines 
being used by reviewers and by institutions. This was probably a teething 
problem, but it led to some institutions doing more preparation than QAA 
actually required.  
3.64. One of the factors that cause ‘over-preparation’ is that it appears to be 
largely left to QAA’s expert reviewers to determine what information they 
wish departments to prepare for them in DATs. While less than in Subject 
Review, there are still tendencies by some to treat this as a ‘trial by paper’ 
and we have anecdotal evidence of this, for example: 
 
A reviewer at the institution mentioned in 3.41 above still insisted on having course 
handbook documentation made available for all the programmes which were now 
excluded from the review. [O] 
 
One reviewer (not at a case study institution) did not request a significant volume 
of paper or number of staff to be made available for his DAT but was advised by 
QAA that ‘the institution will be disappointed if you do not ask to see more’. He 
complied, reluctantly, but with no intention of reading the additional 
documentation.  
 
One reviewer had asked for a large number of staff to be made available, including 
some from outside the institution being audited. In the event, none of these was 
interviewed and the institution felt that the time of many staff (and students) had 
been wasted. It was particularly difficult to explain this to partner organisations. [T] 
 
3.65. DATs appear to have some of the features of a compromise. They do not 
provide the rigorous professional judgement of Subject Review or a PSRB 
accreditation, yet as practised they retain elements (such as the need to 
view student work and heavy documentation requirements), which make 
them potentially detailed and expensive for institutions. Some institutions 
and auditors feel that DATs can be valuable (and some academics regret 
the loss of the more exacting and public Subject Review). However, DATs 
add significantly to the cost and pressure of audit – for QAA as well as for 
institutions; they also arguably skew the ethos of audit in an undesirable 
direction. We question whether they add sufficient value to justify these 
negative impacts.  
 
The audit visit and the review team 
3.66. Many institutions commented that the visit itself was a positive experience 
with a non-adversarial atmosphere and a well-prepared review team of 
respected professionals:  
 
‘There was no point scoring’ (M).  
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3.67. However, with the much broader remit of audit (compared to Subject 
Review), some reviewers appeared to struggle to lift their sights above the 
detail or to understand the broader institutional context. Some ‘wanted to 
go over the past’ even though the institution felt things had changed so 
much this was a waste of time.   
3.68. In a few cases, institutions had a complaint about the choice of reviewers. 
There will always be occasional reviewers with ‘baggage’ and QAA cannot 
avoid this altogether. However, it does seem a good principle that a 
majority of reviewers (but not all) should be from institutions that the 
audited institution recognises as of at least equivalent academic standing, 
with relevant experience of an HEI of similar size and complexity. In one or 
two cases, institutions being audited did not feel this was the case.  
3.69. A significant number of institutions made a point about the composition of 
teams, and the way the work is divided. They noted that the team was not 
really a team, but a group of individuals, each dedicated to pursuing a 
certain area of interest, and without a leader. This led to some repetition; 
to a lack of integration in the discussions and the report; and it meant that 
there was no-one to look at broader strategic opportunities, or, conversely, 
to put things back on track if needed. This was manifested in a variety of 
ways: 
 
‘The review team seemed very reluctant to understand that the university had 
moved on (since a previous audit) and this wasted a lot of time re-running old 
issues.’ [M] 
 
‘One auditor had difficulty grasping that the way this institution works is really very 
different from his own.’ [M] 
 
There were simple misunderstandings – when auditors were pursuing lines 
of enquiry which were inappropriate – but no easy way to address these; 
 
In four cases reviewers wished to focus on collaborative provision in a way which 
the institution had been led to believe was outside the scope of this audit (and for 
which they had not prepared). In one case, this led the institution to abandon a 
small but successful widening participation initiative. (N, O, R and T) 
 
One reviewer made what appeared an inappropriate request for large volumes of 
documentation to be prepared overnight causing considerable stress to junior 
staff. [O] 
 
One institution was asked very general questions including ‘demonstrate evidence 
of change management’ and found it hard to know where to start, and what 
evidence could be acceptable. [O] 
 
3.70. Not all institutions had this experience – some were complimentary about 
the way the audit team worked and commented on how well prepared and 
professional they were, and on the role of the core auditor in facilitating 
this. But the examples we have just cited are more than just isolated 
incidents. They were significant for the institutions concerned.  
3.71. These concerns are undoubtedly connected with the great expansion in 
auditor numbers (which has been driven particularly by the large number 
of DATs and foundation degree reviews which QAA has had to staff). 
Some experienced auditors we met regretted the fact that this expansion 
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has ‘taken some of the professional interest out of the job’ and it has 
forced QAA to look much wider for auditors, with some dilution of the 
seniority, calibre and commitment of auditors. This is unfortunate at a time 
when the new process of Institutional Audit has an opportunity to establish 
itself as a higher-level and more developmental experience for institutions.  
3.72. However, if institutions feel they are being put under non-productive 
additional stress, the answer to this is partly in their own hands. A 
confident institutional manager who has a good relationship with the QAA 
can challenge whether such requests are really necessary (and some do 
so). QAA advises asking what question the reviewer is interested in 
answering and whether there could be other, less burdensome, ways of 
helping this enquiry. We would like to see more institutions confident 
enough to do this. However, we can understand that it is sometimes hard 
for the institution being scrutinised to do this (and in one case, such a 
query was squashed with a ‘get on and do it’ reply). A larger responsibility 
must lie with the review team to avoid unnecessary demands adding to the 
pressure on institutions to ‘over-prepare’, and to the costs of audit.  
3.73. A related point is that as each reviewer is delegated to concentrate on 
certain aspects of QA, the dialogue during the visit can become disjointed 
and repetitious, and this can be reflected in draft (and some final) review 
reports. On occasions where one reviewer is unavailable to comment on 
drafts, institutions have noted that QAA seems unable to progress editing 
that reviewer’s section of the report – with consequent adverse impact on 
factual accuracy, quality, and evenness of the report. An appropriately 
senior and confident core auditor should be able to take more of a role 
here, provided the system allows for this.   
3.74. We note in passing that the system in Developmental Engagements is 
different, given the role of co-ordinating reviewer that permits one reviewer 
to lead the visit and the report preparation.  
3.75. A final point concerns the end of the audit visit. There may be an end-of-
audit meeting, but some institutions we visited had not experienced one 
and gave the perception that the review team just fade away. After what 
may have been months of gruelling work, and a week of considerable 
stress for some staff, it is probably important to have some kind of closure 
for those involved. 
 
Outcomes and benefits 
3.76. All the institutions we visited expressed themselves satisfied with the 
outcome of the audit in the sense that they felt the process was 
professional and the judgement made was fair. In one case where there 
was a disagreement over the scope of the audit, the institution felt the 
judgement was fair, but did not believe the review team had properly 
gained the evidence to reach its conclusion. 
3.77. However, several institutions commented that they found the audit report 
disappointing in more than one sense: 
• the judgement of ‘broad confidence’, as we have noted, did not 
enable them to celebrate any areas of real excellence, and it is 
very difficult to enthuse staff or explain to overseas students or 
partners that this is ‘the best outcome available for a high quality 
institution’ 
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• the report did not appear to ‘add much value’ beyond what was 
already in the institution’s SED. 
3.78. These points reflect the way Institutional Audit is done, and they are not 
necessarily a criticism of the review teams, or of QAA. However, since it is 
a process which is of such importance to institutions, many would have 
liked to have a report where the quality of the insights and drafting was 
higher, and they would have liked more willingness to acknowledge and 
celebrate good practice where it was found. This would require a shift of 
emphasis, and a single author with more time available than is possible on 
the current QAA model for audit. This could add significant benefit at little 
cost. 
3.79. A potentially more serious criticism was raised by a small number of those 
we met. They believed that only small or vulnerable institutions get poor 
reports, and questioned whether reviewers were unduly influenced by the 
reputation of institutions.  
3.80. Despite these points, there is no argument that there are significant 
benefits for institutions from Institutional Audit. Institutions gave us many 
benefits they perceived, and we have reproduced some of these to give a 
flavour of the points made. (This is not a comprehensive list, some points 
were made by more than one institution, and not all the points are of equal 
significance.) 
 
‘A useful external check on quality and standards, which can also help internal 
improvement.’ 
‘…helps the university to value its own academic processes (and, for example, to 
resist the more instrumental approach to HE required by some funders)’.  
‘The QAA provided a ‘good practice framework’ around which our own Subject 
Review process was designed.’ 
‘…forced the university to address a number of areas that needed attention’.  
‘It was a very important reassurance and confirmation for the institution.’ 
‘UK HE benefits nationally from having a system with bite.’ 
‘Writing the SED is a mechanism for pulling the university together after a process 
of restructuring.’  
‘It involved library and support staff in a way which was very positive for them and 
for showing that this is a team effort.’ 
‘DATs encourage academics to reflect on their practice and to think about how the 
systems relate to their work.’ 
‘It caused us to check things which as busy people we wouldn’t otherwise have 
done.’  
‘It helped to involve, and broaden the experience of, part-time academic staff.’ 
‘It enhanced student involvement and the student experience.’ 
‘It helped to disseminate good practice and contribute to efficiency in the 
institution.’ 
‘It helped with our reputation and ability to attract good students.’ 
‘One department was “so pleased with its DAT report it circulated (it) to all the 
people on our Christmas card list”.’ 
‘It was a lever to bring less co-operative academics into line.’  
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‘QAA is a bit like being hanged in the morning. It concentrates the mind.’ [S] 
Referring to DAT: ‘Out of the darkness of all the extra work comes the light of 
achievement.’ [S] 
 
Student involvement 
3.81. One of the successes of Institutional Audit has been student involvement. 
Many institutions made the point that they already had close relations with 
students in respect of QA. Student representatives are normally included 
in all the main QA committees and processes in institutions. However, the 
experience of preparing for audit had facilitated a dialogue with the 
students’ union which was valuable for both parties. In particular it was 
refreshing to have a renewed focus of attention in this dialogue on the 
core business of student learning. 
3.82. At nearly all our case study institutions we had discussions with students 
who had been involved in preparing student submissions to the QAA for 
the Institutional Audit, and in the audit visit. (In some cases, this involved 
the institutions contacting students who had now left the university and we 
are grateful to both the institutions and the students for the efforts they 
made to meet us.) 
3.83. The students’ perspective was at least as positive as that of the 
institutions. They appreciated being involved in the audit, and had 
generally made very full and constructive submissions. These were 
generally perceived by their institutions as having been very supportive of 
the institution in the audit.     
3.84. It is worth noting that it can be a significant effort for a students’ union to 
prepare a submission. Some conducted student surveys as part of the 
process, and this can be a relatively daunting process (sometimes the 
parent institution provided material assistance while protecting the 
independence of the results). The National Union of Students (NUS) 
nationally provided training and support to students’ union officers (with 
QAA participation). Many of those involved would have appreciated rather 
more specific written guidance from QAA, particularly in respect of the 
data collection expected. For smaller unions, freeing officer time for this 
involvement was a real issue. However, the NUS stressed that students 
perceive it as being valuable.   
 
 
Other QAA reviews and related activity 
 
Developmental Engagements  
3.85. Developmental Engagements were introduced as an interim measure to 
aid the transition from Subject Review to Institutional Audit, and several of 
the case study institutions had experienced DEs. The model for DEs is 
rather different from that of Institutional Audit. There is a team of four, 
which includes a review co-ordinator, a subject specialist, an auditor, and 
an institutional nominee. A visit lasts two days and leads to a short report 
which is confidential to the institution, QAA and HEFCE. QAA did over 150 
DEs during 2002/03 and 2003/04, and in all cases, these resulted in 
judgements of confidence. 
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3.86. In a couple of cases, institutions would have preferred to have a cross-
discipline DE, but HEFCE was unable to allow this, as there was pressure 
for subject-related assurance. 
3.87. Institutions had mixed views about DEs. They were not generally 
perceived to be ‘light touch’ (although less intense than Subject Review). 
Most institutions found them a positive experience, but some staff 
regretted the lack of recognition the outcome received. 
 
Foundation degree reviews 
3.88. Reviews of foundation degrees (FDs) are not part of the QAF. The 
purpose of these reviews is to investigate the distinctive features of 
foundation degrees (which include complex partnership arrangements and 
work-based learning), to establish the quality of the students’ learning 
experience and to investigate whether each programme is likely to meet 
the standards of a foundation degree award. HEFCE decided that a 
separate review of foundation degrees needed to be undertaken as they 
were the first new major HE qualification developed in 25 years (and 
confidence in them needed to be established). QAA was asked to carry 
out a large programme of FD reviews, and four of our case study 
institutions had experienced these and commented on them.  
3.89. Institutions’ view was that it was too early to review FDs before the first 
cohort of students had graduated. The review was therefore seen as a 
further accountability requirement rather than a developmental review. 
Some felt the limited focus and paperwork kept costs low, but one smaller 
institution was concerned that the burden was heavy in relation to small 
student numbers (‘QAA are sending five assessors for two small courses’). 
One noted that the QAA handbook is ‘bigger than for the whole of 
Institutional Audit’.  
3.90. We understand the policy interest in FDs, which led HEFCE to 
commission these reviews. However, the volume of new review activity 
appears large in relation to the ‘lightness of touch’ policy now in force.  
 
The Academic Infrastructure 
3.91. As part of our investigations at case study institutions, we learnt a good 
deal about institutions’ attitudes to the Academic Infrastructure (see 
paragraphs 2.44 – 2.49), and the way this had been implemented. 
3.92. In general, there is support for the concept of a set of consistent 
mechanisms across the sector. Institutions also made comments on these 
mechanisms. 
3.93. The Framework for Higher Education Qualifications is seen as useful, 
necessary and not burdensome for HEIs. 
3.94. Subject benchmarks work well in certain of the more vocational disciplines 
where there is external control of the curriculum (‘in engineering 80% of 
the curriculum is determined by the accrediting professional bodies’ – 
institution M). However, for a number of disciplines (such as philosophy) 
they are pretty meaningless (‘one could write almost the same statement 
at GCSE level’ – institution J). They are not seen to create a huge amount 
of work for HEIs. 
3.95. Programme specifications have been an issue for a few institutions. Most 
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agree that the concept is right, but a few resent the perception that they all 
have to be written down in exactly the specified format or the QAA will 
‘mark us down’. In one or two cases, this led to large peaks of work ahead 
of a QAA audit. 
3.96. The Code of Practice arouses some ambivalence. Some institutions say it 
is much too big: ‘why not just limit it to the precepts’ (and we note the 
BRTF comments), but at the same time a number of HEIs would like QAA 
to be more specific in its guidance. 
3.97. External examiners are universally agreed to be very important. They are 
the real check on student work and on standards. It is important to protect 
and enhance this system. There are worries that TQI may (unintentionally) 
damage it. Several institutions would like to see the external examining 
process enhanced and made more central to a more developmental 
approach to audit. One institution suggested that full and frank external 
reports could go to QAA as part of the audit process – ‘much more 
sensible than publishing them via TQI’. And, ‘extending the external 
examining role could be more valuable than DATs’.    
3.98. We had a couple of examples where the Academic Infrastructure was not 
fully in place before the QAA audit. This meant that the audit created a 
good deal of work for the institution. We have not counted this as a cost of 
the audit, but it will have been perceived so by some academics. The 
institutions recognised this, and saw the outcome of the audit as beneficial 
in this regard. 
 
TQI and NSS  
3.99. Inevitably, we only have provisional views based on the preparations for 
TQI and NSS, as neither has yet been fully implemented, and it is too 
early for any benefits to have been appreciated. The main views we 
obtained were as follows:  
• Institutions are not convinced that the present design makes sense. 
They support the concept of information for students and of student 
surveys, but there is concern that a ‘one size fits all’ format is being 
imposed without regard to institutions’ existing activity, and that this 
will, in effect, damage institutional diversity and the meaningfulness of 
information for students and others. 
• In particular, several institutions were unhappy at the way that use of 
Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) data, JACS codes, and the 
rounding down of small student numbers would unfairly damage the 
perceptions of their institution. Some had to incur extra costs (such as 
establishing a new parallel website) to compensate for misleading 
impressions of the institution’s provision on the Higher Education 
Research Opportunities (HERO) website.  
• Those with active and successful student surveys fear that the 
National Student Survey will damage their students’ willingness to 
provide the more detailed and more meaningful local feedback which 
they find valuable and which is more useful to prospective students. 
• They perceive it has been poorly implemented, in particular they are 
unhappy at the way the rules keep changing – this has led to extra 
costs for some institutions. Institutions also regret the lack of helpful 
central guidance on common issues like data protection.  
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• There is a split in opinion about whether it is a burden – a few find it is, 
others say ‘no big deal’, but none felt that the benefits will be sufficient 
to justify the extra work involved.  
• There is a concern about the effect of ‘dumbing down’ external 
examiners’ reports for publication. 
• They are not convinced that many students will get any real value out 
of it. 
3.100. However, it is important to note that it was not part of our remit (and it is 
anyway too early) to seek wider views on the benefits of TQI and NSS 
outside of HEIs. The NUS made the point to us that it supports both TQI 
and NSS as providing information for students to make the right choice for 
their needs and this view was echoed by many of the students we 
interviewed, who felt such information would be helpful and informative for 
prospective students. They are keen that both TQI and NSS are evaluated 
from the students’ point of view as soon as practicably possible. It is also 
important that TQI is part of a change which included the end of Subject 
Review. 
3.101. We feel some sympathy for those who are charged with implementing this 
initiative. It was never likely to be easy or popular with institutions. (And of 
course a wider study than ours might well find significant support for it 
outside of institutions.) Nevertheless, we perceive that institutions are 
raising some serious concerns which need to be addressed in an open 
manner.  
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4 The Costs of Academic Review Activity 
4.1. In this chapter, we summarise the evidence on the costs of the academic 
QA review activity described in chapter 3. We also explain the approach 
we have taken to costing more generally. 
 
 
Types of cost to be considered 
4.2. For completeness, we could note that the institutional costs identified in 
our work summarised in chapter 3 fall into four main types which could 
potentially be considered as part of the costs of an Institutional Audit or 
other review process: 
 
a. Specific institutional costs of a review. This is the specific cost 
related to a particular audit event such as one Institutional Audit. It 
would include academic and management staff time spent in activities 
directly related to the audit or review including: briefings and 
preparations; writing SEDs; assembling documentation; and attending 
meetings with QAA and with the review team. It would include some 
time devoted by other staff supporting this process (secretarial, 
administrative, IT, library, student support etc). It would also include 
minor costs associated with providing accommodation, IT support, and 
refreshments for reviewers, and printing documents.  
 
The costs here also include a share of estates and indirect costs 
which are real costs at all institutions and need to be allocated to QA 
activity, just as they are to teaching or research. 
b. Associated institutional costs of review. This is the more general 
cost incurred by institutions as a result of the existence of the 
programme of QAA work, but not solely driven by one individual audit 
event. It could include improvements made to their systems and 
documentation in advance of an audit; it could include the costs of 
implementing recommendations made in audit reports; it could include 
the cost of making academic staff available to work as auditors for the 
QAA. 
c. Consequential costs of review. This would include damage to 
reputation. Some institutions could identify negative consequences 
from audits, such as closure of poorly performing departments or 
courses, and loss of key staff. This is more strongly relevant in the 
case of Ofsted inspection described in chapter 5, where some 
institutions incurred loss of student numbers and income.     
d. Non-financial costs. These costs cover disruption and lost 
opportunity. These would include costs incurred through changes in 
institutional behaviour (such as becoming risk averse or less willing to 
innovate) and costs where senior managers and academics were 
effectively prevented from doing things they would otherwise have 
done because they were preparing for a QAA audit. Institutional 
developments, research, and scholarship were the most common 
areas mentioned here but also innovation in teaching and learning, 
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and even student support. We would also include impacts such as 
stress imposed on staff by review. 
4.3. We have assembled a base of robust quantitative evidence on the specific 
costs of audit or other review to institutions (a). This is the main focus of 
our assessment of costs and benefits. 
4.4. We have not included costs of type (b) or (c). 
4.5. Arguably, the associated costs at (b) are things that institutions should be 
doing anyway in order to comply with the Academic Infrastructure and 
accepted good practice. In the case of the consequential costs (c), the 
inspecting agencies could argue that loss of poor quality provision is a 
benefit of inspection, not a cost. 
4.6. However, we believe that the non-financial costs (d) are an important and 
relevant part of the overall burden on institutions. These are very difficult 
to quantify.  
4.7. The analysis of costs we provide in the rest of this report is therefore 
focused primarily around the costs of type (a), that is, the cost that 
institutions incur specifically in preparing for and receiving an external QA 
visit or inspection. We have built these costs ‘bottom-up’ by including a 
number of elements, which are listed in paragraph 4.8 below. In most 
cases, the major cost is staff time, which we have counted in hours, days 
or weeks as appropriate and costed at an appropriate average salary-cost 
band, with appropriate TRAC indirect costs added. The staff time is of 
course an estimate, but these details were generally fresh in the minds 
(and diaries) of most staff we met and many of them provided 
corroborating evidence (such as timetables) so we have confidence in this 
evidence. 
4.8. For example, at institution G, the total cost we calculated for its 
Institutional Audit was made up of the following elements, each of which 
we costed separately:  
• agenda time for academic standards committee 
• Institutional Audit (IA) working group meetings 
• first drafting of SED 
• departmental briefings 
• coordination by deans 
• pro vice chancellor overview 
• departmental administrators’ review team 
• dry run events 
• student briefing meetings. 
4.9. We have similarly built up costs relating to a DAT in each academic 
department. For example (from a computer science department): 
• deputy head of department’s time spent on writing SED 
• head of department’s input on overview of preparations 
• department administrator time at university organised awayday 
• departmental workshop for all academic staff 
• staff involved in both the audit day and a dry run. 
4.10. This bottom-up approach, coupled with the chance to discuss and test 
estimates leads us to believe that the estimates of time and cost we have 
made are unlikely to be seriously in error, although there is an inherent 
element of uncertainty in apportioning time between externally-generated 
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QA and work that would be done anyway for internal purposes. Overall, 
we believe error bands are likely to be around 10% to 20%.  
4.11. The costs in each case study institution were full costs for 2003/04, 
established using a standard methodology based on TRAC principles10.  
4.12. We have used a standard staff cost for all staff involved in QA activities of 
£77,500 (at 2004/05 pay levels). This figure is composed of two amounts: 
£52,500 direct staff costs including ‘on-costs’ (superannuation and 
national insurance); and £25,000 for indirect and estates costs of the 
institution. 
4.13. The direct staff cost (including on-cost) is informed by average budgeted 
cost for institutions for senior administrative staff, senior/principal lecturer 
grades and professors. Six of the case study institutions provided this 
information at an early stage of the project. The average staff cost does 
not take account of secretarial or any but senior administrative support, as 
this is covered through use of the indirect cost rate. 
4.14. The indirect cost rate incorporates costs for estates, teaching support 
time, departmental support for teaching and an adjustment for the cost of 
capital employed. This method is consistent with other costing projects 
recently completed for HEFCE, notably the cost of Widening Participation 
study and the cost of postgraduate research. Taking TRAC data from all of 
the case study institutions provided 12 data points, from which the 
£25,000 average was derived (local variability was seen to be +/- 25%). 
 
 
Headline costs results  
4.15. Table 1 provides a summary of the specific institutional costs of the 
different QAA processes which we observed at each institution in our 
sample during the transitional phase of the QAF, i.e. 2003-2005. 
4.16. Table 1 shows that the costs of the core Institutional Audit, which our 12 
institutions experienced in 2003 or 2004 varied from close to £100,000 in 
three institutions (2, 7 and 12) to over £400,000 in institution 5. 
4.17. The cost of the DATs associated with that audit varied from below £50,000 
in three institutions (8, 11 and 12) to over £300,000 in two cases (3 and 6). 
Overall, the cost of the DATs is broadly equal to the cost of the rest of the 
audit, but there were wide variations between institutions. 
4.18. Table 1a provides additional information on the numbers of DATs, DEs, 
and FD reviews experienced by the case study HEIs, and the range of 
costs of these reviews. This shows that the cost of an individual DAT 
varied from £5,000 to £71,000 with an average of £36,000. Also shown, 
the number of DATs varied widely (from 1 to 7 with an average of 4.3). 
4.19. Tables 1 and 1a show that the costs of Developmental Engagements and 
foundation degree reviews were generally significantly smaller than the 
costs of the core audit. The costs of one DE were broadly similar to a DAT 
(average £36,000), while the costs of one FD review were significantly 
lower (£22,000). The numbers of these also varied significantly between 
institutions (seven HEIs had two DEs each, the other five had none; two 
HEIs had one FD review, two had two FD reviews, the other eight had 
none). 
                                                
10 Transparent Approach to Costing, Volumes I to III, JCPSG, 1999 to 2004. 
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4.20. One of the most striking factors in this table (apart from the total 
magnitude of the costs) is the wide variation in costs of a similar event 
between our 12 case study institutions. This is illustrated in figures 3 and 
4.   
 
Total costs to the sector 
4.21. Table 2 shows the average costs per case study and an aggregation of 
the costs observed in our 12 case study institutions, to show the total 
impact on the sector of 130 HEIs in England. This is on the assumption 
that the 12 institutions in our sample are reasonably representative of the 
English sector as a whole. We believe this is the case.  
4.22. Table 2 shows that the average cost (mean of the 12 HEIs in the sample) 
of the core institutional audit was £207,000 and the average cost of the 
(variable number of) DATs was £155,000. DATs therefore made up over 
40% of the total costs of audit for our institutions. 
4.23. The average cost of DEs for our sample was £42,000, and of FD reviews 
£11,000. So, if these were included as part of the ‘QAA cost’ incurred by 
institutions during this transitional period, the relative cost would be as 
follows: 
 
Table (ii): Average relative costs of QA components for the sample 
 
 £000s % 
Core audit 207 50% 
DATs 155 37% 
DEs 42 10% 
FDs 11 3% 
Total 415 100% 
 
4.24. Table 2 also shows the annualised costs (all the above were over the 
three-year transition period). This was £121,000 for Institutional Audit plus 
DATs, and £138,000 in total. 
4.25. Extrapolating this across the sector of 130 HEIs in England, table 2 shows 
that the cost of this first round of audits plus associated other QAA reviews 
for the whole sector was in the region of £57m, or £19m per year during 
this transition period. 
4.26. Included in this, we calculate that the costs borne by individual HEIs of 
providing auditors for the IA process has amounted to £1.3m per year for 
the three-year transitional period. This is on an assumption of five 
members of the audit team covering 130 institutions. Our costs for this are 
derived from discussion with core auditors, audit secretaries and discipline 
specialists on their recent experience. (This amounts to between three and 
four and a half weeks each for each member of the team, depending on 
function.) 
4.27. This annual cost of academic QA of £138,000 per institution is equivalent 
to two full-time senior posts. This will be helpful as a comparison when we 
look at the projected future steady state cost of the QAF in chapter 6. 
4.28. It is also worth noting that £138,000 per institution per year, while a 
burden, is a significant reduction compared with what institutions 
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experienced during the preceding three year period under Subject 
Review11.    
4.29. Of course, the total cost for institutions also included professional QA 
discussed in chapter 5. It also included the non-quantifiable costs which 
we discuss later in this chapter. 
 
Factors causing the variations in specific cost 
4.30. We have already noted the wide variations in costs amongst our sample 
as shown in table 1 and figures 3 and 4. 
4.31. Tables 1 and 1a show that the cost of the core audit varied by a factor of 
over five (more than 500%) between the highest and lowest cost in our 
sample. The cost of a DAT varied by a factor of over 10. The combined 
cost of the audit plus associated DATs varied by a factor of over five 
(£134,000 to £707,000). 
4.32. We believe that three main factors explain this wide variability in costs in 
this first institutional audit. These are: 
• the size of institution and range of provision 
• the institution’s readiness and approach to audit 
• its engagement with QAA. 
 
Institutional size and range of provision 
4.33. The size of institution, and the spread of programmes has a bearing on the 
costs for three main reasons: 
• a larger institution has to involve more people in the audit 
• a larger number of DATs will increase costs 
• a larger school or department (with a broader spread of modules or 
programmes) has potentially to produce much larger volumes of 
documentation for reviewers. 
4.34. Of course, the costs may be relatively more of a burden for a smaller 
institution, due to diseconomies of scale and we discuss this later. Equally, 
a larger institution with a broader spread of programmes is more likely to 
incur a wider range of additional types of professional QA (such as Ofsted, 
health and PSRBs).  
4.35. Our results show that there is only a weak positive correlation between the 
QA costs incurred by the institution and the size of the institution 
(measured by income [source: HESA]). Figure 4 shows the wide range of 
‘per unit’ costs experienced by our case studies. The graph plots both ‘QA 
spend per student FTE’ (the top line, FTE being full-time equivalent) and 
‘QA spend, £ per £000s income’ (the lower line) for each of the 12 
institutions. The ‘QA spend per student FTE’ varies from £9 to £107, with a 
cluster around £15 to £35. The ‘QA spend per £000s income’ varies from 
under £1 to £17, with a cluster around £3 to £5. These differences are not 
solely due to size: institutions 11 and 12 are both small but their costs are 
very different: institution 1 is four times the size of institution 2 but their 
costs are very similar. 
                                                
11 It was outside our remit to cost this, but most institutions found Subject Review much more costly 
than Institutional Audit. 
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Readiness and approach to audit 
4.36. A second significant cost driver relates to how well-prepared the institution 
was for audit and the way the institution approached the audit. 
4.37. We would observe, for example, that at least a part of the high costs 
incurred by institution 5 was due to a need to consolidate and articulate a 
number of processes which were not uniform across the institution, and 
this added to the cost of preparation before the audit. Of course these 
were largely one-off costs and should not be experienced in its next 
Institutional Audit.   
4.38. Institution 11 considered that this ‘first time’ effect was such that at its next 
Institutional Audit (assuming the process has not changed fundamentally) 
its costs could reduce to about a third compared with its first audit.  
4.39. Institution 8 had in effect already prepared a ‘complete dry-run’ for audit 
with its own internal subject reviews and processes that it had specifically 
designed around the QAA guidance. As a result, this institution ‘saved’ a 
significant proportion of the resource it would otherwise have had to 
devote to responding to the audit.   
4.40. By contrast one or two institutions consciously set out to ‘involve all staff 
and get the most out of the process’ (that is, treating the audit partly as a 
staff development exercise). Institution 9 decided to use it as an 
opportunity to make every department review its processes. Its costs were 
more than twice those of institution 8. 
4.41. Neither approach is right or wrong. The latter costs more, but this might be 
right for the institution if it also led to increased benefits.   
4.42. A key aspect here relates to the maturity and confidence of the institution 
in its QA processes. Institution 1, for example, adopted a very confident 
approach to its audit with a clear philosophy that it was going to ‘take QAA 
at its word’ and to adopt a ‘light touch approach’ to its preparations. Its 
costs were below average.  
 
Circumstances of the audit 
4.43. The third cost driver we have identified relates a number of factors broadly 
related to the engagement with QAA and specific to the inspection event, 
which can have a bearing on costs. These include: 
• how much lead-time was given (some HEIs rightly or wrongly prepared 
many more departments than were to experience DATs because they 
were unable to forecast which would have DATs) 
• The quality of the relationship with the QAA assistant director and 
audit team (in a few cases, misunderstandings or poor communication 
added to costs in a way which arguably might have been avoided if 
two senior people had been able to have a quick conversation) 
• how the review team behaved during the visit (such as accepting 
electronic information or demanding overnight production of large 
volumes of paper; requiring large numbers of staff on standby in case 
they might be interviewed) 
• how early the audit was in the cycle (some misunderstandings over 
requirements were evident in earlier audits) 
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• treatment of collaborative provision. (Although most institutions 
understood that collaborative provision would be reviewed separately, 
some reviewers appeared to see this as something where they could 
‘catch institutions out’. There was a significant tendency in our sample 
for reviewers to demand information and access which institutions had 
not expected or prepared for.) 
4.44. There were significant variations here, from which we believe both 
institutions and QAA can learn lessons which will help to reduce costs in 
future.   
 
Self-inflicted costs (and ‘gold-plating’)  
4.45. It is arguable that a proportion of the institutional direct costs of audit 
which we observed are self-inflicted. 
4.46. One aspect of this occurs when there is an institutional decision to ‘put a 
bit more in’ in the knowledge that this is either necessary because 
systems are weak, or to treat an impending audit as a developmental 
exercise. 
4.47. A further example occurs (normally with PSRBs) when institutions may 
have some choice about which external accreditations to seek. This 
reflects an institutional decision to seek to be recognised as excellent, 
rather than just compliant, and hence to incur additional costs. 
4.48. A third example of this was given to us by a couple of institutions that 
claimed that they had to over-prepare for audit because ‘the costs of 
anything going wrong were simply huge’. This was notably the view of 
institutions with either a very high reputation to protect, or conversely, 
those which felt they were still trying to prove their credentials as an HEI. 
4.49. All these examples reflect a deliberate policy to obtain broader benefits 
from an audit or review and to prepare more fully, or accept more review 
activity in consequence. We see these as appropriate actions by 
institutions, provided they are based on some form of cost/benefit 
analysis.  
4.50. A different, and arguably less justifiable, example (and this is where we 
might use the term ‘gold-plating’) occurs when institutions incur extra costs 
without any conscious institutional decision. In our observation, this might 
happen for a number of reasons: 
• senior management has simply not made a proper assessment of 
costs and benefits 
• there is no clear central policy and leadership to departments in 
preparing for audit 
• ignorance about QAA’s or other agencies’ processes 
• inadequate administrative support for academics 
• academic staff (without the benefits of strong leadership and support) 
in effect deciding to ‘err on the side of caution’ in their preparations for 
audit as they ‘don’t want to let the side down’.  
      
38  
4.51. It is clearly a matter of judgement when understandable caution becomes 
gold-plating, but we would suggest that much of the following activity is 
usually gold-plating: 
• preparing SEDs for departments which have recently had a periodic 
review (and we note that, if asked, QAA is happy to accept such 
departments for DATs) 
• preparing large volumes of module boxes. (We agree that the 
guidance on this is potentially ambiguous, but QAA is categorical that 
it requires ‘a sample’ of documentation not every possible module 
[and institutions could ask before initiating huge printing exercises]) 
• dry runs, road shows and mocks are probably inappropriate in most 
cases 
• involving all departments in briefings for the audit 
• broadening the DAT process so it becomes a ‘mini-audit’ of the 
department 
• re-invention of the wheel in different departments due to lack of clear 
institutional guidance 
• persisting (without good reason) in maintaining internal QA processes 
which make it much more difficult to deal with an audit. (It is notable 
that those institutions which had adapted their internal processes to 
the QAA Code had much lower costs.)   
4.52. Our assessment is that the combination of these factors added 
significantly to the costs of audit for some departments and some 
institutions and we have given some specific examples in chapter 3 (see 
paragraphs 3.54 to 3.64 for example). Arguably, this is wasteful, and an 
inefficient use of public funds. It is increasing the burden of review, and 
reducing the cost effectiveness of institutional audit.  
4.53. It is difficult for us to put a precise cost on this over-preparation, but over 
the 12 case study institutions we found that approximately 8% of core 
institutional audit costs and 12% of all DAT costs were gold-plating of the 
type described. If extrapolated across the whole English sector, this would 
suggest that the total avoidable costs of over-preparation in this first round 
of audits was of the order of £1.5m. 
 
 
Costs of preparing for TQI and NSS 
4.54. We were asked to review the costs incurred by institutions in preparing for 
TQI and the NSS. We discussed these in chapter 3. This is a much more 
difficult area of work to cost than Institutional Audit, for at least two main 
reasons: 
• unlike an audit, there is no single event around which activity and 
costs can be focused 
• both TQI and NSS are still in their early stages and there is not yet a 
clear consensus of views about what is involved. On the contrary, 
institutions seem to have widely differing views about how much work 
will be required. 
4.55. However, more than half of our case study institutions were able to identify 
the costs they have incurred in preparations for TQI, and that they expect 
to incur on an annual basis. Eight institutions were able to provide data on 
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time spent on TQI set-up and six were able to project or estimate what 
they expect to be the annual commitment. The method of estimation 
varied from actual minutes for upload of already formatted external 
examiners’ reports to time estimates for the responsible members of staff. 
There was a wide variety of both actual costs experienced to date and 
expected future costs, with an average of about £24,000 for expenditure 
on set-up and £24,000 annually for future upkeep (a coincidence of 
figures). On the assumption that these are realistic and representative 
costs, we would expect the sector to have incurred start-up costs for TQI 
of the order of £3m, and to incur annual costs of £3m in future. 
4.56. We do not have reliable estimates of the cost of the NSS for institutions. 
4.57. HEFCE has provided figures which suggest that the central costs of 
TQI/NSS were approximately £2.5m in 2004/05, and will be approximately 
£1.25m per annum in future years.  
 
Other costs  
4.58. We have identified the specific quantifiable costs of individual academic 
QA reviews. These include the costs of ‘lost’ academic time. 
4.59. In addition to these specific costs, there are important ‘non-financial’ costs 
which can be considered in three categories: 
• opportunity cost 
• risk avoidance etc 
• cultural costs. 
 
Opportunity cost 
4.60. Many institutions made the point that there is a cost of audit that goes 
beyond the specific hours measured. A typical quote was:  
‘The time and energy that might have gone into institutional development has all 
gone into preparing for audit.’  
We have already quoted the department which lost four research years. 
Another head of department missed out on a whole season of academic 
conferences, with consequent impact on his teaching and research. 
4.61. We have many analogous comments from departments – mostly about 
research or scholarship, but also about innovation in teaching and 
learning, and enhancement of the student experience. In one case the 
institution mentioned having to shut down certain student services during 
the peak of preparations for audit. Another lost the use of two classrooms. 
4.62. For institution I, ironically, the activity displaced by preparation for the IA 
was the preparation and dissemination of a good practice guide for QA 
across the university. 
 
Risk avoidance or hindrance to innovation 
4.63. One institution made a strong point about this. The postponement of 
needed restructuring led to the loss of at least two staff who the institution 
did not wish to lose. Another postponed the development of a collaborative 
course. Institution R closed a small widening participation programme as a 
direct result of the Institutional Audit, but not because it felt it was of an 
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unsatisfactory quality. 
4.64. However, there is a counter view. Other institutions said that it was 
inappropriate to postpone or cancel anything because of audit. One said 
‘the checking mechanism should not get in the way of the doing’. We 
agree. This approach was a more confident one – effectively to make the 
changes, but explain to the QAA what was happening and why. This was 
also consistent with this institution’s more open and self-critical approach 
to its SED. 
 
Other non-financial costs 
4.65. More generally, but less easy to identify, we believe there is an effect of 
regulation in creating institutional dependency on the regulators’ own 
requirements and in discouraging real thinking about what would be best 
for the institution. (Too much accountability drives out enhancement.)  
4.66. Small institutions tend to feel a particular burden, as they tend to have 
fewer senior staff and administrators and academic staff will tend to carry 
a greater share of the workload. As one small specialist phrased it ‘it 
would be hard to find a member of staff who was not touched [by 
Institutional Audit]’. Although size is not the most significant variable, there 
would appear to be a number of fixed time costs, and these will clearly 
weigh heaviest on the smaller HEIs. However, all would agree that 
Institutional Audit is clearly a step in the right direction here, compared 
with the previous regime of Subject Review. 
4.67. One noted that UK institutions can be adversely affected in competing to 
attract overseas academics because they perceive that the high burden of 
regulation will adversely affect their careers. There are also adverse 
impacts on staff morale when repeated or excessive review occurs with no 
evident benefit to students or the work of the department. 
4.68. Several institutions noted that for academic staff, their contribution to 
external QA was often on the basis of ‘goodwill’ and it was frequently the 
same cadre who volunteered to participate in these ‘additional’ activities 
(which might also include, for example, widening participation initiatives). 
The time contributed was often unpaid and out-of-hours, resulting in 
working weeks that could reach 50-60 hours and create a great deal of 
stress. 
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5 Professional Quality Assurance  
 
Introduction and scope 
5.1. In this chapter, we review the impact of all the non-QAF review processes, 
i.e. those we have called professional review of QA. This is a more diverse 
field of activity than that covered under academic review in chapter 3, and 
the evidence base that we can draw from a sample of 12 HEIs is more 
limited.  
5.2. In addition to the common academic QAA and TQI processes discussed in 
chapters 3 and 4, most HEIs (10 of 12 in our sample) are also subject to 
professional QA review processes. Each institution’s experience of this 
additional QA will differ, driven by the particular mix of professional and 
vocational programmes it offers. 
5.3. This professional review activity is very diverse, and we have not sampled 
it all. However, we have covered five main areas, which we discuss in the 
sections which follow: 
a. Initial Teacher Training, which is funded by the TTA and is subject to 
inspection by Ofsted. (We also look much more briefly at the training of 
FE teachers.)    
b. Undergraduate medical education, which is funded by HEFCE and 
subject to review by the GMC. 
c. Non-medical health professions, where the education is commissioned 
by the NHS. There are more than a dozen health professions involved, 
and the picture is correspondingly complex. A new Major Review 
process is being implemented by QAA on behalf of Skills for Health, 
and replaces a large number of former processes. There is also 
associated monitoring and review activity by a number of statutory 
professional bodies such as the Nursing and Midwifery Council, Health 
Professionals Council and also by some individual (non-statutory) 
professional bodies.   
d. FE provision in HEIs, which is funded by the Learning and Skills 
Council and inspected by Ofsted and the Adult Learning Inspectorate 
(ALI).  
e. Review and accreditation of a wide range of professional or vocational 
education in areas like law, engineering, computing, business, 
journalism, architecture by professional and statutory regulatory bodies 
– we review some 30 of these, listed in table 5. 
5.4. These five categories together cover or illustrate most of the professional 
education and QA activity in the sector. However, they are not completely 
comprehensive. Our aim in this part of the study is to identify and assess 
the major types of external review, and to make a fair assessment of the 
order of magnitude of the total burden imposed on HEIs. We have not 
attempted to review every contact of our case study institutions with all 
external inspecting bodies. This would require a much larger study with 
correspondingly greater burdens on institutions, as there are more than 50 
active PSRBs in category (e) alone. 
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5.5. These factors mean that it is a more complex task to assess the total costs 
and benefits of external QA in this part of the sector. We have used the 
same approach for collecting evidence and costs, as in the academic QA 
area described in chapters 3 and 4. However, the diversity of experience 
across the 12 case study HEIs means that our sample size in any of these 
five categories will be smaller than 12 and variable – for example, we have 
reviewed costs and benefits at: 
• two institutions with medical schools 
• six with inspection of Initial Teacher Training 
• two with inspection of training of FE teachers 
• six which had experienced the new Major Review in Health 
• three with Ofsted/ALI inspection of FE provision 
• 10 with accreditation or other reviews by professional bodies. 
5.6. For convenience, we have divided this chapter into five main evidence 
sections, corresponding to the five sectors described in paragraph 5.3. In 
the sixth section, we summarise the costs of all this professional review 
activity for the HE sector. 
   
     Ofsted inspection of Initial Teacher Training  
 
Background 
5.7. In 1994, after some years of government concern about the quality of 
teacher training, and its alignment with national needs, the Government 
created the Teacher Training Agency to plan and manage funding for ITT, 
and with a remit to fund providers of ITT on the basis of quality. 
5.8. There are 74 HEIs providing ITT, mostly providing both primary and 
secondary ITT, and accounting for approximately 90% of total student 
places (the remainder is school-centred initial teacher training SCITT). The 
main professional qualification is qualified teacher status (QTS), and most 
students also gain a higher education award such as the Postgraduate 
Certificate in Education, PGCE). 
5.9. There is also an employment-based, graduate entry route to QTS, known 
as the Graduate Teacher Programme which is undertaken by some, but 
not all HEIs engaged in ITT (as designated recommending bodies).  
5.10. The TTA funds approximately 60,000 trainees per annum. 
 
Agency objectives and process 
5.11. Ofsted is a non-ministerial government department, and has a statutory 
inspection role. It inspects ITT on behalf of the TTA and provides the 
information on quality which the TTA needs to fulfil its remit.  
5.12. The primary purpose for Ofsted inspection is public accountability, but it is 
increasingly also about improvement (raising standards). The inspection of 
ITT can lead to shifts in funding and provision with the aim of improving 
standards. Some courses have been shut down through this mechanism, 
and HEIs rated as ‘good’ or ‘poor’ may be offered more or fewer student 
numbers. So, there is a direct link to funding (and jobs). More than one of 
our case study institutions had lost student places in this way.   
5.13. The Ofsted/TTA inspection regime is quite complex as the inspection is 
conducted in two parts. The initial visit, early in the period, focuses on 
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management and quality assurance, and unlike QAA but similar to some 
PSRBs, includes observation of teaching. The second inspection visit, at 
the end of the semester, involves observation of the trainees’ classroom 
performance in schools. Separate inspections take place for primary ITT 
(encompassing M&QA, English, maths, and science) and for secondary 
ITT (encompassing M&QA and specific subjects). 
5.14. There have been two phases of inspection. The initial phase from the mid-
1990s identified a number of weaknesses in provision, and led to some 
significant shifts in the allocation of funding. 
5.15. Towards the end of this first phase, the overall standard of provision was 
judged to have improved significantly, and Ofsted introduced a lighter 
regime which alternated short and full inspections for training providers 
rated good or above. This was reckoned to reduce the impact on HEIs in 
terms of provider’s days of inspections by approximately 40%. Part of this 
change was a greater emphasis on the M&QA in the HEIs, and relatively 
less front-line observation of teaching. As a result M&QA is included in 
each year in which primary or secondary subjects are inspected; one HEI 
had experienced three inspections of its M&QA in two years.  
5.16. Although there were some initial weaknesses in the M&QA area, 
standards have continued to improve to the point where a further 
streamlining of the inspection process may be justified. The TTA and 
Ofsted have recently consulted on this. They are introducing a new 
inspection model from September 2005. This will further reduce the impact 
of inspection on providers, particularly for secondary provision, by moving 
to the inspection of secondary provision overall, through subject sampling, 
and by allowing high quality providers to receive only short inspections. 
This move away from the inspection of subjects to the inspection of 
procedures for assuring quality is in line with changes to school 
inspections. 
 
Ofsted and TTA costs of inspection of ITT  
5.17. TTA has approximately 7.5 post-holders working on QA. Its total annual 
costs including staff on-costs are approximately £290,000. 
5.18. Ofsted has a budget of £2m (2004/05) for inspection of HEI-based ITT. 
This is the total cost to Ofsted, including administration and travel etc. It 
can be expressed as representing approximately 2,000 inspector-days on 
secondary inspection, and 800 inspector-days on primary inspection. 
Broadly, a short primary inspection requires 21 inspector days and a full 
one 77 days. In secondary, the position is more complex as it depends on 
the number of subjects being inspected.  
5.19. The costs of Ofsted inspection of work-based ITT (the Graduate Teaching 
Programme - GTP) are relatively small, and are more complex to identify 
(not least because the involvement of HEIs is more complex).   
 
Impact on HEIs  
5.20. We have identified benefits and costs of Ofsted/TTA inspections at six of 
our case study institutions (Nottingham Trent, Birmingham, St Mark and St 
John, Greenwich, Cambridge and Bath Spa UC).  
5.21. The present system of Ofsted inspection is changing as we have noted. 
The present system of short and full inspections began in 2002/03 and so 
HEIs are in the third year of what would have been a six-year cycle. Each 
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will normally have had one inspection in this period. If the previous grading 
of ITT was good or better, the inspection will have been a short one (to be 
followed later in the cycle by a full one), if it was graded below this the 
inspection will have been a full one. The nature of these inspections differs 
between primary and secondary provision. But this regime will now 
change again as a result of further streamlining and the second part of the 
cycle will not now take place. 
5.22. Another important part of the context is that the institutional response to 
TTA and Ofsted is, to a much greater degree than with QAA, left to the 
individual faculty or school of education to determine and manage. Like 
much other professional education, ITT is a work-based, vocational, partly 
off-site form of education involving complex partnership arrangements with 
a large number of schools.  
5.23. Institutions’ perceptions of Ofsted review differed significantly amongst our 
sample. One large institution had no comments or concerns, but most 
others gave us a selection of views and experiences. We have attempted 
to give a fair representation of these institutional views in the following 
main points. 
Frequency and costs 
5.24. A key contextual point is that the frequency of Ofsted visits, coupled with 
the (greater) length of the academic year in education make it particularly 
difficult for education faculties to accommodate research and other 
activities. They can feel disadvantaged relative to other disciplines. 
5.25. Several commented on the continuous nature of the review process: 
 
‘…with primary, and several subjects in secondary ITT, Ofsted are always in the 
institution – continuous inspection which is disrupting’. 
 
‘The one free year in the three-year cycle is not long enough to innovate, 
implement and evaluate change.’ [I] 
 
‘We are over-inspected (partly because of some previous poor scores). In (three 
subjects), each subject leader will be inspected three years in a row (full under the 
old regime in 2002/03; M&QA inspection of secondary in 2003/04; full inspection 
in 2004/05).’ [J] 
 
‘They will be in the school for two out of every three academic years, and will 
inspect M&QA on every occasion.’ [M and N] 
 
‘The head of secondary never gets a year off.’ [J and N] 
 
Nature of the process 
5.26. A general view is that the inspection regime is ‘more bureaucratic’ than 
QAA, and that there is less of a feeling of trust and peer review. But, 
institutions find the interaction with individual lead inspectors valuable and 
it often provides useful feedback [C, M and N]: 
 
‘It is rather rigid and formulaic and the consequences of not maintaining standards 
are awful (with an almost immediate cut in numbers) so there is a tendency to 
stick to the rules rather than to innovate.’ [M] 
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‘Unlike QAA, the reviewers do not have to discuss their judgements and provide a 
balanced view. One bad observation can lead to an immediate negative 
judgement.’ 
 
‘[I did not like] the snapshot approach (e.g. of staff in post on the day) without 
regard to whether this is a fair reflection of reality.’ [J] 
 
Seriousness of potential consequences 
5.27. The key point that nearly all institutions made here is that the results of a 
poor inspection are potentially serious for the institution, and this can lead 
to an over-cautious approach by institutions, and elevated costs: 
 
‘Much of the pressure comes not from the inspection itself, but from the possible 
consequences of loss of funding.’ [C] 
 
‘The system encourages gold-plating because of the consequences of a poor 
score.’ [N] 
 
Other comments included: 
‘The system is constantly changing…’ 
 
‘…but it is getting lighter touch, which is welcomed.’ 
 
‘In shortage subjects like maths, we normally ‘bend’ to recognise a broader range 
of student applicants’ qualifications and do a corresponding amount more work to 
support these students. In an Ofsted inspection year, we are forced to become 
more rigid because there is insufficient time to bring the subject skills of these 
students up to the expected standard.’ [N]  
 
Costs for HE sector 
5.28. Table 3 shows the costs of this QA review for HEIs on an annualised 
basis. The costs of Ofsted inspection of ITT range from £16,000 per year 
at institution 8 to £152,000 at institution 7.  
5.29. The variation in cost arises from a combination of the number of subjects 
offered at secondary level and how these inspections are ‘grouped’; 
whether the institution is a designated body for the Graduate Teacher 
Programme (which adds a greater than average inspection cost to the 
total); whether the institution manages a SCITT programme in which case 
it may have a voluntary involvement in validating the SCITT PGCE which 
is outside the scope of Ofsted inspection; and the provision of a Key Stage 
2/3 programme. 
5.30. The variation in cost does not reflect whether the ‘short’ or full inspection is 
experienced first for any aspect of provision as this is smoothed over the 
six-year cycle we have assumed. It appears that the chief factor in 
determining the level of cost experienced is the method of preparation. 
5.31. One institution experienced significantly more cost than the average. This 
institution had experienced some poor Ofsted scores in previous years; 
had had a change in senior management; was in the process of reviewing 
all its systems and processes; and was experiencing full Ofsted 
inspections in two consecutive years. It might be said to have been 
‘catching up’ and was therefore exceptional and we have not included its 
costs in our extrapolations to sector level.  
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5.32. Table 4 shows that across the whole sector, the annualised costs of 
Ofsted inspection of ITT for HEIs might be expected to be in the region of 
£3.8m. 
5.33. We should note that there are also significant costs for schools (which is 
outside the scope of this study), and that some elements that can affect 
Ofsted’s judgements are outside HEIs’ control. 
5.34. We consider future steady state costs in chapter 6. 
 
Conclusion 
5.35. We conclude that this Ofsted inspection of Initial Teacher Training: 
• is important for accountability and its broader benefits to education and 
to the nation 
• has served a useful purpose in the past in raising standards 
• imposes a significant cost on the faculties where it occurs partly 
because of other factors, including the length of the academic year in 
ITT 
• is perceived by HEIs to be relatively bureaucratic, and to duplicate to 
some degree (in the M&QA for example) the central processes of QAA 
(but clearly also has a distinctive role in terms of the professional and 
school-based elements that are not covered by QAA) 
• has been responsive to many of these complaints, and has now been 
streamlined twice 
• is perceived by some to have a rigidity which stifles innovation in 
teaching and learning  
• has had a significant impact on funding for institutions with lower 
quality scores.  
5.36. Two of our case study institutions said they would appreciate a shift 
towards more observation (since it would be less of a snapshot and the 
whole range of teaching methods could be observed) as this is the area 
where they feel that value is added. This is connected with the view that 
there is more than one way to produce students who are fit for purpose, 
and a perception that Ofsted may have a process which is too rigid to 
allow them to recognise this.  
5.37. Particular areas suggested by institutions for improvement include: 
• reducing the M&QA element to what is genuinely not covered by the 
QAA (or by other Ofsted visits) 
• greater reliance on evidence and documentation already provided for 
other purposes (such as internal annual and periodic review)  
• a more flexible and developmental approach 
• greater continuity of lead inspectors (which had reduced costs for one 
of our institutions). 
 
The training of teachers in the Learning and Skills sector 
5.38. We have not reviewed FE teacher training in detail, but two of the 
institutions we visited provided data and views on this.  
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5.39. There is a great variety of courses (inspected by Ofsted/ALI) for FE 
teachers provided by HEIs, at levels 2, 3 and 4. Some of the provision is 
by HEIs themselves, but a great deal is also provided through formal 
consortia and partnership arrangements with FE colleges. It is difficult to 
identify the exact number of providers in the sector at different levels, or to 
identify what might be classified as a ‘typical’ arrangement. 
5.40. One institution considered the review was bureaucratic and burdensome, 
‘a huge overkill’ for a very small part of the institution. It must be added 
that their view was coloured by a poor experience with the Further 
Education National Training Organisation (FENTO) which was not 
perceived to be of value to the institution. The second institution also 
expressed a more specific concern about FENTO requirements for FE 
teachers. In its view, FENTO’s prescriptions such as standard English, 
level 3 numeracy etc for ‘what are essentially trades’ are inappropriate. 
5.41. One of the two providers we visited estimated an annual cost commitment 
of only £4,000. The other (with six partner colleges) estimated a larger 
annual commitment of £17,000. On the evidence of this study, it is not 
possible to estimate which of these experiences might be considered as 
more typical of the sector as a whole. However, we understand that the 
total number of inspections planned for this year is less than 20 and so the 
annual equivalent cost for the sector as a whole is unlikely to exceed 
£300,000. Due to the uncertainty around this extrapolation, we have not 
included this element in our detailed cost analysis for the sector. 
   
     Review of medical education 
 
Background 
5.42. The GMC has been monitoring medical schools for more than 150 years. 
The GMC currently recognises 27 medical schools (including four new 
schools that are two-to-three years into the initial accreditation cycle). 
Twenty of these are in England. Within the GMC there is a team of five 
full-time members of staff with responsibility for the Quality Assurance of 
Basic Medical Education (QABME). They are supported by 73 ‘visitors’, a 
combination of medics, lay representatives, public health representatives 
and medical students, who undergo a rigorous recruitment and training 
scheme. 
5.43. In 2004 the GMC piloted a new QA process with three medical schools – 
Aberdeen, Birmingham and Liverpool. The process was also adopted in 
the four new medical schools (which will be assessed each year until the 
first cohort have graduated). The pilot was deemed a success and will be 
adopted, with minor modifications, from this year. 
 
The QABME process 
5.44. Established medical schools will experience two QABME cycles in 10 
years, with the scope for additional cycles if there are any significant 
changes (such as new programmes) or causes for concern. In addition, 
they will be asked to submit an annual report. 
5.45. A complete QABME cycle takes about 18 months and falls into three 
broad phases: 
a. Notification and preparation: The GMC send out a questionnaire 
document concerning the school’s ability to meet the requirements of 
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‘Tomorrow’s Doctors’; the school submits evidence; then the team meets 
and agrees any particular issues to be covered in the visits.  
b. The visit cycle: This comprises five visits of one-to-two days each (not all 
team members attend all meetings). Visits include observation of students 
and exams and are spread across a six-month period to fit with the 
school’s teaching and examination timetable. Informal feedback is 
provided at the end of each visit.  
c. Reporting: A report is produced and the school has an opportunity to 
comment before it is published. The report is signed off by the team and 
the school before it is sent to the undergraduate board. From this year, 
the report will include requirements (mandatory action points) and 
recommendations (desirable action points), as well as highlighting any 
examples of good practice. If the undergraduate board is happy with the 
response to these, the final report is sent to the education committee. 
5.46. The GMC liaises with the QAA to ensure its visits cover all the areas QAA 
has an interest in. As a result, medical schools visited by the GMC are 
exempt from DATs. 
5.47. There are 7-10 visitors on each team – typically eight. The visitors are paid 
for an average of 10 days per annum, which includes one day of training. 
As far as possible, visitors to the new medical schools will remain in place 
for the complete first cycle (around six years). Other visitors are divided 
into sub-groups of three by area of expertise, and sub-groups will swap 
teams. This is designed to foster a team spirit, whilst retaining ‘freshness’. 
Visitors are expected to cross-observe another team. 
 
Benefits and issues 
5.48. The process is still in its infancy, so it is hard to draw firm conclusions. 
Whilst it is designed to bring more transparency, it replaces a system that 
was ‘lighter touch’. Despite this, feedback from the schools has been 
positive. There are a few aspects of the process and issues worth noting: 
 
a. The inclusion of students in visitor teams: The GMC feels this has been a 
particular success of the new process.  
b. Visit length: The GMC believes that shorter visits are more focused; allow 
it to see more people; mean the whole team is not required for each visit; 
and are better for observation. It also believes the approach lessens the 
burden on schools. 
c. Visitor teams: There is a great deal of effort put into recruiting and training 
visitors and in ensuring they feel ‘part of a team’. This includes 360-
degree appraisal for visitors and GMC advisors. 
d. Good practice reports: The GMC publishes a report on the ‘good practice’ 
it has found during the course of its visits each year. This reflects its 
interest in QE and collaboration. 
e. Education advisors: Each medical school will be assigned a GMC advisor 
as an initial point of contact. The main purpose is to improve 
communications with medical schools and to take a more ‘proactive’ role 
in the relationship.  
f. Electronic data: The GMC would prefer to receive evidence electronically 
but it must be easily accessible and navigable to visitors. In support of 
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this, it has a ‘one-click’ rule for signposting and accessing material. Its 
experience in the pilot HEIs was that the schools struggled to meet these 
requirements, and most schools ended up submitting in a variety of 
electronic formats, including some hard copy where unavoidable. 
 
Impact on HEIs 
5.49. Two of the institutions in our sample have medical schools (Birmingham 
and Cambridge). Unfortunately neither was a ‘typical’ example of the new 
GMC process, which is in the process of change. Institution 4 had incurred 
an exceptionally low cost associated with a GMC visit which took place 
under a previous review regime and which required the university to 
produce almost no new documentation. The second (6) was a 
pilot/reference site for the new GMC approach and probably had elevated 
costs for this reason.  
5.50. Institution 6 found that the workload was similar to a DAT. It was 
impressed by the quality of the panel and the insightful and practical 
nature of the report. 
5.51. From this limited sample, we extrapolate in table 4 that the annual whole 
sector cost for GMC review of medical education is approximately £1.5m. 
This must be regarded as an indicative figure. 
      
Review of health professions education 
 
Background 
5.52. Allied health professions education is funded by the NHS and has until 
recently been commissioned by workforce development confederations 
under individual contracts with HEIs. In future, this provision will be 
commissioned by the strategic health authorities (SHA).  
5.53. The largest group of students is nurses and midwives, but other large 
professions include physiotherapy, podiatry and radiography. There are 
also some very small professions (such as orthoptists). 
5.54. A common feature of all these professions is that the education is 
delivered in a partnership with service providers. The HEIs lead in terms of 
curriculum, academic assessment and award, and they provide a home 
base and pastoral support for students. However, a significant part of 
student learning takes place in clinical environments under the immediate 
supervision of NHS clinicians rather than academics. The external QA 
arrangements have to accommodate this.  
5.55. The education commissioners carry out monitoring against their contracts. 
This is a burden (some of our HEIs estimate 20-30 days per year) and it 
can include aspects of QA and fitness for purpose. However, we have 
excluded it from our costs, just as we have contract monitoring by other 
agencies such as the TTA. 
5.56. The main external QA is provided by the statutory and/or professional 
bodies which exist in most health professions and are concerned with 
ensuring minimum standards and fitness to practice (usually through 
accreditation of education and registration of practitioners), and with 
support to professional development.  
5.57. The two largest statutory bodies are the Nursing and Midwifery Council 
(NMC) and the Health Professions Council (HPC). These are relatively 
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new bodies and have replaced the former United Kingdom Central Council 
for Nursing, Midwifery and Health Visiting (UKCC) and national boards 
which visited HEIs to monitor quality of nursing, midwifery and health 
visiting education, and the Council for Professions Supplementary to 
Medicine (CPSM) and its (approximately 12) constituent professional 
bodies which also visited HEIs for the same purposes in respect of the 
other allied health professions. 
5.58. Our case study institutions have provided information about the following 
professional bodies which also review QA: 
• Royal Pharmaceutical Society of GB 
• British Psychological Society 
• Institute of Biomedical Science (IBMS) 
• Royal College of Speech and Language Therapists (RCSLT) 
• Chartered Society of Physiotherapists 
• Royal College of Radiographers. 
5.59. We understand that the QA activities of some of these professional bodies 
will be replaced by the HPC monitoring, but institutions are uncertain 
about this. 
5.60. The following box illustrates the role and relationship with HEIs of a few of 
these PSRBs.   
 
 
Nursing and Midwifery Council 
 
The NMC undertakes annual monitoring, coupled with validation visits on a 
five-year cycle.   
 
Annual monitoring involves marshalling and checking the evidence base and 
the production of a short report and course statistics. In some cases, the NMC 
has been happy to accept internal annual monitoring reports. There are also a 
number of placement visits. It is not seen as particularly burdensome by HEIs, 
and some participants felt it was a beneficial process. 
 
Re-validation events involve a greater number of placement visits, as well as 
the production of a SED. Major changes to programmes or the introduction of 
new courses (initial accreditation) carries a much higher workload.  
 
Health Professions Council 
 
The HPC is a newly formed independent regulatory body, with responsibility 
for setting and maintaining standards of professional training, performance 
and conduct of 13 professions allied to medicine. The expectation is that the 
HPC will take over responsibility for monitoring and accrediting degree 
courses from the existing professional bodies, whilst liaising with them to 
ensure it makes good use of existing expertise and notes that ‘Working within 
our legal obligations, we will aim to avoid duplication of the work of others’. 
 
Currently, most of the professions covered by the HPC are working on a five-
year cycle, with annual monitoring. The HPC expects that programmes will 
normally be approved on an open-ended basis, subject to satisfactory annual 
monitoring returns. Changes to programmes will be assessed against 
established criteria to determine whether they will trigger a new approval 
event. Approvals of new programmes will be dealt with as they arise, but the 
HPC is encouraging HEIs to group programmes so that approvals can be 
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dealt with in one event. The HPC will retain the right to visit even if no major 
changes occur or ongoing issues arise through the annual monitoring process. 
Nonetheless, the process is likely to prove ‘lighter touch’ for many HEIs. 
 
Multi-profession visits will be encouraged, where appropriate. Panels will 
comprise two-to-eight members, drawn from academics and the professions, 
with some lay representation. In cyclical visits to HEIs the panel will participate 
in HEIs’ internal periodic review procedures. It will produce a list of 
documentation and a set of forms but will accept other documentation as long 
as it meets its information requirements. After the visit, HPC visitors produce a 
report for submission to the approvals committee. The full report will be 
published on the HPC website and summaries will be published in the annual 
report of the education and training committee. 
 
Institute of Biomedical Science 
 
The IBMS acts as ‘agent’ for the HPC in accrediting courses in biomedical 
sciences which lead to fitness to practice certificates for students. 
 
The IBMS does not prescribe a curriculum but does define discipline areas 
which should be covered. An IBMS member will always be present at a 
validation event and would attend regular course reviews if invited. Typically, 
the IBMS would come and review the provision once every five years and 
would be prepared to rely upon data collected for another purpose – internal 
QA documents, for example. An annual return is also required, in a prescribed 
format, but of data already collected for internal processes. 
 
Regional Council for Clinical Physiologists (RCCP) 
 
The RCCP undertakes annual monitoring, with a five-year re-accreditation 
cycle. There is a heavy workload associated with initial accreditation, including 
the approval of all external examiners. This is exacerbated by the fact that it is 
a relatively new body, still clarifying its exact requirements. 
 
Re-accreditation visits cover several days, spread over six months to one year 
and involve a great deal of preparation, probably similar to a DAT. Much of the 
syllabus is set down in RCCP guidelines and the visit focuses on: overall 
course content; a summary of each module for approval; the way practice is 
monitored; and the documentation to support the course. Two half-day visits 
to students on clinical placements are also included. 
 
Royal College of Speech and Language Therapists 
 
The RCSLT have been conducting re-accreditation visits on a five-year cycle 
but there is currently some uncertainty among HEIs about whether these visits 
will continue, or whether the HPC is going to be taking over the role. Currently, 
these visits are similar in scope to those of the NMC. 
 
 
5.61. In the past, an HEI with a faculty of health studies with a wide range of 
health professions could find that this single faculty was subject to 
inspection by up to a dozen different health professional bodies.  
5.62. The Department of Health accordingly launched a culture change and 
reform project to introduce a new Partnership QA Framework for review of 
health professions in HE. The aim of this is to develop a single set of 
streamlined arrangements aiming to cover all the QA needs of the range 
of external stakeholders. Another important new element is giving full 
recognition to the importance of the clinical education providers (first and 
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foremost NHS trusts) in the review process. The Department of Health has 
recently transferred responsibility for the Partnership QA Framework to the 
UK Sector Skills Council for Health. 
 
Agency objectives and process 
5.63. The new Partnership Framework, rather like the academic QA processes, 
has several elements: 
• programme approval 
• ongoing quality monitoring and enhancement  
• Major Review 
• benchmarks and quality standards 
• the evidence base. 
5.64. The most visible part of this is the Major Review process, which is the only 
part so far fully implemented. MR is carried out by the QAA, on behalf of 
Skills for Health. Major Review complements the QAA Institutional Audit 
and is intended to encompass the three main stakeholder requirements: 
Subject Review; annual and periodic contract review by strategic health 
authorities; and professional and statutory body review. 
5.65. Eighty-eight HEIs will have a Major Review. Sixteen were completed in 
2003/04 (including six prototypes), a further 34 will be done in 2004/05, 
and 38 in 2005/06. The process involves a SED and five visit days (spread 
out as 2+2+1). Two of these days are spent in a clinical practice 
organisation. The SED and other parts of the process are all joint, so while 
the HEI may lead, it has to involve clinical partners at all stages. There is a 
commitment to evaluate Major Review after the first cycle is completed in 
2006. 
5.66. Other parts of the Partnership Framework are still being developed, with 
prototypes of ongoing quality monitoring and enhancement and of the 
approval process currently underway. The new framework will involve a 
process of annual monitoring orchestrated by the strategic health 
authority, which will also incorporate the contract monitoring.    
5.67. It is expected that both NMC and HPC will recognise the Major Review 
process as normally satisfying their QA requirements. It is less clear at this 
stage that other health PSRBs will also do so, and institutions are 
concerned that some of these may continue to impose additional costs of 
QA review. 
 
Agency costs of inspection 
5.68. Costs information provided by QAA (summarised in chapter 3) shows that 
the cost of a Major Review for the QAA is approximately £20,000. 
5.69. There are also costs incurred by the PSRBs, which we have not 
investigated, and for the partner institutions (chiefly NHS trusts) which are 
outside the scope of this study.  
 
Impact on HEIs – costs and benefits  
5.70. We have identified benefits and costs of aspects of health professions 
review at eight of our case study institutions. In six of these, this included a 
Major Review. It also included review by a number of the other health 
PSRBs.  
5.71. While many of these work to the same broad principles, they are all 
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different in detail, for example some observe practice and others do not. 
5.72. A common issue is the complexity of preparing for a Major Review 
involving a number of clinical partners – this cuts across clinical 
commitments and is correspondingly difficult and expensive for the HEI to 
set up. 
5.73. Institutions’ perceptions of this review of course differ from institution to 
institution (or from school to school), but the main perceptions we found 
might be summarised by the following main points: 
a. In principle, most of the HEIs we spoke to were very supportive of the 
new multi-professional approach and the opportunities it provides for 
sharing good practice, as well as cost savings.  
‘It has increased communication between academics in different professions.’ 
[S]  
‘It has helped us to build networks with other HEI providers to share 
experience and act as critical friends.’ [M] 
b. However, there was a concern that Major Review will not replace 
single-profession reviews but will simply add to the burden. 
c. There was also a concern that professions with small student numbers 
might become ‘swamped’ by the much larger numbers and influence 
of nursing. 
d. One department with a non-standard pattern of provision (that is, not 
dominated by large numbers of pre-registration nursing students) 
found the process was not well designed to meet the nature of its 
provision. There were a couple of problems in the preparation for the 
visit with QAA. Overall, it was a positive experience, but not light 
touch. [G]. 
e. In preparing for a Major Review (radiography) this spring institution O 
estimated that the effort required was twice that for a DAT because of 
the partnership nature of the work. An enormous amount of liaison is 
required with NHS sites and the SHA.  
 
Costs for HE sector  
5.74. The costs of this external QA of NHS-funded non-medical provision are 
shown in table 3. 
5.75. The costs of the Major Review for these six institutions are shown as a 
memorandum item at the bottom of the table. This varied from £46,000 to 
£231,000. On an annualised basis, the costs of Major Reviews varied from 
£9,000 at institution 7 to £46,000 at institution 3, and of other non-medical 
NHS QA from £7,000 at institution 1 to £63,000 at institution 6.  
5.76. These differences may in part be explained by the effect of varying spread 
of health provision, and numbers of professional bodies involved.  
5.77. The total annualised cost of all non-medical NHS QA in our sample was 
£356,000, with an average cost of £41,000 as shown in table 4.  
5.78. Table 4 shows that, extrapolating across the whole sector, the annualised 
costs of non-medical health QA review is in the region of £4.4m. 
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Conclusion 
5.79. We conclude that: 
a. This is an important area where professional standards have a direct 
bearing on public protection. 
b. This provision has been over-inspected in the past, due to the large 
number of professional and statutory bodies and other stakeholders, 
and the lack of a strategic multi-professional approach to review of 
QA. 
c. The Department of Health (now Skills for Health) initiative in 
launching Major Review is therefore a welcome development for the 
sector, and most feed-back so far is that the process is an 
appropriate and well-managed one which is a significant step forward 
in at least three respects: 
• recognising the partnership 
• the multi-professional ‘one-stop’ review 
• the peer review basis.  
d. However, these arrangements are new and still evolving. They will be 
reviewed by Skills for Health. 
 
 Review of FE provision in HEIs 
 
Background 
5.80. Approximately 50 HEIs deliver further education to adult learners, 
predominantly in art and design subjects. For most of these HEIs, the FE 
provision forms a small part of their portfolio but for a small number it is 
more significant and for one HEI (the University of the Arts London) it 
forms approximately 30% of the total. 
5.81. Ofsted and ALI are jointly responsible for the inspection of FE provision in 
HEIs. 
5.82. The Learning and Skills Act 2000 sets out the purpose of inspection which 
is to keep the Secretary of State informed about:  
• the quality of education and training 
• the standards achieved 
• whether the financial resources made available to providers are being 
managed efficiently and used to deliver value for money.  
5.83. The Common Inspection Framework governs joint Ofsted and ALI 
inspections of higher-education based FE provision. Higher education 
institutions are inspected on a four-year cycle. A typical visit involves three 
months’ notice of a five-day visit to review students’ achievements, the 
quality of teaching and learning, and the leadership and management 
arrangements. The direct observation of teaching means that inspection 
teams are quite large as they have to include at least one expert from 
each area of provision being reviewed. 
5.84. Ofsted and ALI make up inspection teams using their own full-time 
inspectors, plus part-time inspectors drawn from a register. 
5.85. Following a recent consultation, the inspection regime will be changed 
from 2005 in a way which should lead to a more risk-based approach and 
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a lower number of inspection days per inspection. Of course, all our 
information on costs and benefits is on the existing basis.   
 
Agency costs of inspection 
5.86. Both ALI and Ofsted budget for approximately 10 inspections per year at a 
combined cost of approximately £700,000 per annum. 
 
Impact on HEIs – costs and benefits  
5.87. We have limited information from HEIs which have experienced 
Ofsted/ALI inspection, since our sample only included institutions where 
this was a relatively small part of the provision: 
a. Institution [O] had an Ofsted/ALI visit in the run-up to QAA Institutional 
Audit and in an area chosen for a DAT. The department (of art & 
design) is at the lower limit of student numbers for an ALI audit. The 
time to prepare for Ofsted/ALI is short, so the costs of preparation are 
necessarily less than for the DAT. However, the emphasis on personal 
work of individuals brought added stress. The outcome was good 
however.  
b. Institution R had a good experience. It commented on the good rapport 
with the lead inspector – that they were fair and thorough. In general it 
was seen as more of an inspection than QAA’s approach and not as 
professional. 
c. All institutions commented on the relatively large teams of inspectors 
and the consequent costs for the institution. A typical comment was 
that:  
‘…if four or five QAA auditors can review the whole institution, why does it 
need 10 or 12 Ofsted/ALI inspectors to review a relatively small part of the 
provision (less than 5% for most of our examples)?’  
 
5.88. A different perspective from institution R noted that many of the staff 
affected by this inspection were not involved in any other external review. 
Whilst they did not like the extra workload, there was a benefit in making 
them feel ‘included’ and subject to the same exacting standards as their 
HE colleagues in the institution. 
 
Costs for HE sector 
5.89. Table 3 shows the costs of this QA review for HEIs on an annualised 
basis. The costs of Ofsted/ALI inspection range from £32,000 at institution 
8 to £39,000 at institution 9. The average annual cost is £35,000 (table 4). 
5.90. Table 4 shows that, if these are representative costs, the total cost for the 
sector is approximately £1.6m a year.  
 
Conclusions 
5.91. Our sample base here is relatively small, so we have had informal 
discussions with two other institutions where FE is a more significant part 
of their work. 
5.92. The views we have obtained are relatively uniform, and agree with those 
from the case study institutions. While every institution accepts the need 
for external review, most feel obliged to compare their experience with 
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Ofsted/ALI unfavourably (in terms of costs and benefits) with their 
experience with QAA. While the actual cost to the sector is relatively low, it 
is relatively high in terms of £ per student, and institutions find it irksome to 
have to deal with two different agencies which operate to such different 
processes. The large teams of inspectors and highly structured approach 
adopted by Ofsted/ALI are seen as offering less ability for review teams to 
add value to institutions or to students where the provision is already 
known to be of a good standard. 
5.93. We are aware that there have been a couple of pilot parallel Ofsted/QAA 
inspections and we discussed the outcome of one of these at the 
University of the Arts London. The pilot appeared to confirm that, as the 
two agencies currently operate, there is relatively little, if any, benefit to 
HEIs in attempting to run these different processes in parallel. However, 
this does further emphasise the additional costs to HEIs from having two 
such different processes operating in the same area of provision.  
 
Review by non-government PSRBs (excluding health) 
 
Background 
5.94. Table 5 provides a list of approximately 30 of the PSRBs which we have 
encountered inspecting provision in HEIs. In practice, the impact of these 
bodies varies very widely from some which are, by a significant margin, 
the most intensive and intrusive process experienced by the departments 
concerned (that is, much more significant than a QAA DAT), to others 
where the impact is very modest or negligible. We have categorised them 
according to level of burden in the table. 
5.95. Figure 5 shows that, overall, PSRBs as a group are second to the QAA in 
terms of the cost impact on the HE sector of their review activities. 
5.96. Different institutions will have widely differing experience of PSRBs on 
aggregate, and even perhaps at the level of the individual PSRB. There 
appear to be two elements which drive the costs here: 
a. The extent of vocational provision: an institution with few vocational 
programmes may have little contact with PSRBs, while those with a 
wide range of vocational and professional subjects have many 
contacts. Table 3 shows that the number of ‘relevant PSRBs’ at our 
sample HEIs varied from none to 62, with five of the 12 HEIs providing 
data on more than a dozen PSRBs. 
b. Market positioning: the ‘relevance’ of individual PSRBs may depend 
on the positioning of the institution in the market. One business school 
which recruits internationally considers it requires the ‘triple crown’ of 
accreditation from three PSRBs (AMBA, the European Quality 
Improvement System [EQUIS] and the Association to Advance 
Collegiate Schools of Business [AACSB]) while another school 
positioning its management provision differently, may not find this 
necessary or possible. 
5.97. For the purposes of this study, we have not attempted to review the impact 
of every PSRB. Instead, we have noted at each institution the PSRBs 
which are most significant to the institution, and we have discussed the 
impact of a sample of these with the relevant academic departments. We 
have built up a picture of the broad ‘order of costs’ imposed by the most 
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active PSRBs, and we have also visited or contacted a sample of these 
PSRBs to discuss their objectives and processes. The PSRBs we have 
contacted in this way include: 
 
• General Social Care Council  
• Association of Masters in Business Administration  
• Institution of Electrical Engineers  
• Law Society.  
 
Agency objectives and process 
5.98. The case study institutions were asked to assess what they perceived to 
be the costs of inspection by the PSRBs in table 5, in comparative terms. 
As a simple comparison, the burden of a DAT was suggested as ‘medium’: 
as many of the departments we talked to had recently experienced a DAT, 
this comparison worked well. 
5.99. Only a few PSRBs in total were thought to be ‘heavy’ – or more 
burdensome than a DAT − and the majority were thought to be ‘light’ or 
‘very light’. The costs assumed around these categories varied by 
institution (as did the cost of the DAT, of course) but as a rule of thumb, a 
‘very light’ PSRB would require no more that a nominal day or half day to 
prepare an annual return and a light PSRB might require a short paper 
return and hosting an annual visit. 
5.100. The PSRBs falling into the ‘medium’ and ‘heavy’ category are those where 
significant disruption is experienced by the department. Requirements are 
precise around programme specification and student work, and teaching 
and demonstration sessions are often observed. The level of preparation 
time needed in practice may well be influenced by whether the department 
has recently experienced either a DAT or an internal periodic review 
(when the PSRB may accept the same evidence). However, the ‘medium’ 
category might require in the region of an equivalent 1.0 or 1.5 FTE (a true 
cost of £77,000 - £100,000) and a heavy requirement even more, up to the 
commitment, we are told, of an old-style Subject Review. 
 
Agency costs of inspection 
5.101. We have not collected data on the costs of inspection to the PSRBs 
themselves. Such costs are not directly a charge on public funds, and so 
are, arguably, less important for this study than the costs incurred by the 
publicly funded agencies (such as Ofsted and QAA). 
 
Impact on HEIs – costs and benefits  
5.102. Table 3 shows the estimated total annual cost for PSRB inspections at the 
10 case study institutions with PSRB involvement. Where relevant, the 
annual cost varies from £13,000 at institution 7 (with five PSRBs) to 
£156,000 at institution 10 and £189,000 at institution 8 both of which had a 
large selection of PSRB accredited provision (62 and 30 PSRBs 
respectively). 
5.103. Table 4 shows that this can be extrapolated to an annual cost for the 
sector of £8.8m. In addition, some PSRBs charge accreditation fees, 
which is a further specific cost for the HEIs. We have (incomplete) data 
which suggests that the level of such PSRB accreditation fees across the 
whole HE sector may be of the order of £1m and we have added this to 
the costs of PSRBs in tables 4 and 7. 
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5.104. There are also significant benefits of PSRB review for HEIs. As noted 
above, it is often a critical factor in market positioning and student 
recruitment for HEIs. More generally, many PSRBs are regarded as 
representing the ‘learned society’ for the profession, and so are natural 
partners for academics in HEIs. While PSRB review is relatively costly for 
HEIs, it is therefore generally accepted as a valuable and necessary part 
of professional standards and development.   
5.105.  We have assumed the costs associated with inspection by PSRBs will 
remain relatively constant, although there are variations by discipline 
which may mean the costs experienced by individual institutions differ. For 
example, there is evidence to suggest that some engineering institutions 
are looking to streamline their processes, whilst in business and 
management, QA requirements tend to be increasing. 
  
Summary of costs of professional QA 
5.106. Table 4 summarises the annual costs incurred by institutions in each of 
the five categories of professional QA discussed in this chapter. 
5.107. The estimated costs for the whole HE sector in England are as follows: 
 
Table (iii) Summary of estimated annual costs of professional QA for 
English HE sector 
 
 £ 
Ofsted inspection of ITT 3.8m 
GMC review of medicine 1.5m 
Review of NHS-funded health provision 4.4m 
Inspection of FE in HE 1.6m 
Inspection by PSRBs 9.9m 
Total professional QA 21.2m 
 
5.108. This costing can be compared with the annual cost of academic QA of 
£19m discussed in chapter 4. The burdens associated with academic QA 
under the QAF, and professional QA are therefore broadly the same. This 
is illustrated in figure 5 which shows the breakdown of the total costs of 
external QA incurred by institutions, attributed to the relevant inspecting 
agencies.  
5.109. The comments we have made in chapter 4 about the non-financial costs of 
inspection and about over-preparation and gold-plating apply in just the 
same way to professional QA. As with academic QA, there is significant 
scope to reduce the costs of professional QA without loss of essential 
accountability or other benefits. We discuss this further in chapter 6. 
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6 Conclusions  
Introduction 
6.1. In this chapter, we draw together our findings and analysis in a 
cost/benefit assessment of the existing inspection and review 
mechanisms. We propose some areas for further attention with the aim of 
reducing the burdens on higher education institutions without losing 
significant benefits. Finally, we estimate the likely future ‘steady state’ 
costs of external review of QA if these changes are implemented.  
 
 
Principles for regulation of quality in higher education  
6.2. First, we explain the rationale we have used in these assessments. 
 
Limitations of inspection of quality 
6.3. The assurance of quality in higher education is complex. Quality is a 
subtle and precious commodity, and is not the same for all disciplines, all 
institutions, or all students. While external review can help to measure and 
protect standards, and to encourage quality enhancement, it cannot 
provide an absolute measure of quality. (Nor can it deliver improvements 
in quality – only institutions and their staff can do that.) 
6.4. A member of one of our steering groups noted that there is a tension 
between the diversity of the English HE sector (which is rightly celebrated 
by Government) and the understandable desire of regulators for simple 
and uniform measures and processes. The regulators have to recognise 
that any indicators of teaching quality that they might seek to apply across 
the whole HE sector can be no more than proxies, and that a ‘one size fits 
all’ approach to measuring quality would risk damaging the diversity and 
innovation they wish to foster. 
 
Rationale for the totality of inspection 
6.5. HEIs are subject to a complex mixture of review processes, and the 
benefits and purposes of this system as a whole have not been defined. 
Each agency has its own purposes, but their review frameworks have 
grown up to address the different requirements of different departments 
and regulators. 
6.6. We therefore need an element of pragmatism in assessing the costs and 
benefits of the review to which HEIs are subject. But the five purposes 
discussed in chapter 2 provide a helpful framework for our evaluation. 
 
Proportionality and desirability of reducing burdens of inspection 
6.7. Although inspection is valuable and necessary, it is not a good in its own 
right. It has a direct cost to the taxpayer. And it diverts academic effort 
from supporting students.  
6.8. We therefore take the position that the burden of review should be the 
minimum that is required to deliver the specific assurance and benefits 
that are its stated purpose. We suggest three principles, which flow from 
this and draw upon the BRTF principles of regulation: 
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a. Any particular element of an HEI’s provision should normally only have 
to experience external review by one government agency; 
this means that where more than one agency has a legitimate interest 
in the same area of provision, they should co-operate and share 
information to avoid subjecting HEIs to multiple visits with different 
data requirements. As one HEI said to us ‘one visit, by one agency, at 
one time’. 
b. The demands of review on those being reviewed should be related to 
the level of risk and the volume and cost of the provision concerned. 
c. Where HEIs already have available information on their QA processes 
and outcomes (for example on internal websites) which is closely 
related to the agencies’ needs, it should be the presumption that the 
agencies will use this existing information wherever possible (with the 
HEI providing appropriate access, signposting and additions) rather 
than requiring recreation of very similar data to particular formats. 
 
 
Conclusions  
6.9. We can draw together the evidence summarised in chapters 3, 4, and 5 in 
some general conclusions about the inspection of QA in higher education. 
 
 
Conclusion 1: The total quantifiable cost of review for the English HE 
sector is approximately £40m per annum. 
6.10. The evidence summarised in table 4 shows that the total cost burden on 
HEIs in preparing for, and dealing with the visits of inspecting, accrediting, 
and reviewing agencies is of the order of £40m annually. On average, this 
is approximately £309,000 per institution or the equivalent of the full 
economic costs of four full-time senior posts. This cost is split roughly 
equally between academic QA and professional QA. This is shown in 
Table A. 
6.11. These figures are averages. The actual cost varies very significantly 
between institutions as discussed in chapter 4 and illustrated in figures 3 
and 4. It will generally be lower for small institutions with a narrower range 
of provision, and higher for larger more diverse institutions. However, the 
actual costs experienced by institutions also vary very widely for a number 
of reasons apart from size, which were discussed in chapter 4.  
6.12. If central costs to the inspecting agencies are included, the total direct cost 
of review would be close to £50m per annum. 
 
      
61  
Table A: Current HEI costs of external review on an annualised basis  
 
 Average per 
HEI  £000s 
England 
£m 
Academic QA (transition phase)   
Institutional Audit 69 9.0 
DATs as part of audit 52 6.7 
Developmental Engagements 14 1.8 
Foundation degree reviews 2 0.25 
Provision of auditors for QAA 10 1.3 
Total academic QA (QAF) 147  19.1 
   
Professional QA   
Ofsted inspection of ITT - 3.8 
GMC review of medicine - 1.5 
Review of health provision - 4.4 
Inspection of FE  - 1.6 
Inspection by PSRBs (excl health) - 9.9 
Total professional QA 163 21.2 
Total cost of external QA 310 40.3 
 
Note: where HEIs do not all have the same processes, the £000s figure per HEI is not 
meaningful, and is not included. Full details are in tables 2 and 4.  
6.13. There are also unquantified costs associated with disruption, opportunity 
cost and unintended changes in academic behaviour.  
6.14. We have some less consistent data which suggest that the costs incurred 
by the publicly funded agencies which commission or carry out these 
external reviews (Ofsted, Skills for Health and QAA) may be in the region 
of £10m per annum. We only have limited information, but it seems likely 
that accreditation fees charged by some professional bodies to HEIs add 
£1m to the costs for the sector (but unevenly spread) and this is reflected 
in the figures for inspection by PSRBs. Central costs of TQI/NSS are 
approximately £1m per annum. 
 
 
Conclusion 2: This cost of review has reduced significantly in recent 
years. 
6.15. Our remit did not include quantifying historical costs, but it is clear that 
there has been a significant reduction over the past two-to-three years. 
Most notably, the costs of academic QA that institutions are now 
experiencing under QAA Institutional Audit and associated reviews are 
significantly lower than the costs they were experiencing under the former 
Subject Review and audit regime that was in place until 2002.  
6.16. The other agencies concerned have also been responsive to the 
desirability of streamlining their processes as HEIs’ QA systems have 
matured, and as quality has demonstrably improved. For example both 
Ofsted and Skills for Health have significantly streamlined their processes 
to reduce the costs for HEIs. 
 
 
Conclusion 3: The total cost experienced by the HE sector can be 
reduced further without loss of rigour. 
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6.17. Improvements mean that the balance of costs and benefits is now much 
more satisfactory than it was three or four years ago. However, that does 
not mean that there is nothing left to do. Following the principles set out in 
the introduction to this chapter, it is still desirable to seek further 
reductions in cost where these can be achieved with no loss of benefits or 
of necessary accountability.  
6.18. The sorts of opportunities that we have in mind here include the following: 
a. There are still areas where there can be actual overlap of review by a 
number of agencies (in health, this is now being addressed through 
the Major Review process). 
b. Some agencies’ regimes mean that they can review what is effectively 
the same thing many times over (such as Ofsted looking at M&QA on 
every visit). 
c. New additions to the QA processes (however legitimate in their own 
right) are sometimes simply ‘bolted-on’ to existing processes. 
(Foundation degree reviews are an example.) 
d. Some processes, which may not be particularly burdensome in an 
absolute sense, can appear disproportionate in relation to the small 
student numbers or small risk involved. Examples of this can include: 
• inspection of very small numbers of FE students can nevertheless 
require large inspection teams 
• Ofsted inspection of the Graduate Teacher Programme is 
relatively high cost in terms of small student numbers  
• foundation degree reviews can have several reviewers for a very 
small group of students. 
e. Most institutions perceive that agencies require them to prepare, 
transport, and assemble very large volumes of hard copy 
documentation, much of which is never used. 
f. Many institutions feel that they need to recreate existing 
documentation into different formats and styles to meet the needs of 
inspecting agencies. 
g. A small, but significant, proportion of reviewers persist in behaviour 
which effectively drives HEIs into incurring excessive costs without any 
corresponding benefits. 
6.19. The combination of these factors has a direct impact in raising the costs of 
HEIs.  
6.20. These problems are well known, and we acknowledge that individual 
agencies have made progress in addressing the more extreme examples. 
However, they can do more, and institutions also need to do more to help 
themselves.  
 
Conclusion 4: HEIs could do more to reduce their own costs. 
6.21. As discussed in chapter 4, there is significant ‘over-preparation’ by some 
HEIs. Some of this is a result of a strategic decision by HEIs to ‘do more to 
get extra benefits’ from external review; or to position themselves as 
excellent rather than just compliant; or because they assess that the risks 
of a poor result are simply so serious that they are willing to ‘err on the 
side of caution’. These are all legitimate policy decisions, and of course it 
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is not necessarily an institutional objective to minimise the costs of QA. 
6.22. However, these factors cannot explain more than a part of the extreme 
variations in cost between HEIs dealing with the same QA processes, 
which we have discussed in chapter 4. A small proportion of our sample 
evidenced good practice in having a mature Academic Infrastructure; 
adopting a strategic and confident approach to Institutional Audit; avoiding 
creating new documentation where they already had effective internal 
processes; and being open and developmental in their dealings with the 
QAA. These institutions generally had significantly lower costs of audit, 
and a better cost/benefit ratio, and we believe others could learn from this 
experience. 
6.23. By contrast, some institutions evidenced a significant level of ‘unintended 
over-preparation’, which we believe can legitimately be described as gold-
plating. We gave examples in chapter 4, but they apply equally to 
professional QA. This is where extra costs were incurred with no clear 
benefit intended or achieved. It is simply wasteful and may well also be 
replicated in internal QA processes. Many HEIs could save costs here.  
6.24. Each institution would have to examine its own circumstances and 
practices. However, we would observe that good practice could include: 
 
a. Treating QA of teaching and learning as an institutional strategic 
priority and applying the same kind of senior management attention 
and risk assessment techniques to this, as they do to other strategic 
priorities like the Research Assessment Exercise or major capital 
investments. 
b. Ensuring that (unless there are good reasons to the contrary) 
institutions’ internal academic QA processes are designed to be fully 
compatible with the QAA guidance, thus minimising costs of 
compliance at audit.  
c. Maintaining a central strategic focus to set policy and advise on, 
preparations for audit. 
d. Providing adequate support to academics – in one case, a 
management school with a large burden of external review was able to 
demonstrate that the appointment of a high quality trained senior 
administrator had greatly reduced the burdens on academics and the 
overall costs of audit.    
 
 
Conclusion 5: Institutional Audit is an effective and appropriate process 
with the exception of Discipline Audit Trails.  
6.25. Institutional audit is a good process, which appropriately focuses its 
scrutiny on institutional management and strategy. The balance of costs 
and benefits is an improvement over subject review. The costs incurred by 
institutions in the first transitional phase of audits are approximately 
£120,000 per year (equivalent to 1.5 full-time senior posts). Both 
institutions and QAA can learn from their experience in this first round of 
audits and we expect these costs will reduce further as a result. 
6.26. The DATs are a costly aspect of audit. They were a compromise. At their 
core, they were intended to ‘see if it’s really working in practice’, but they 
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have become also a proxy for the lost Subject Review and this requires a 
different approach and different reviewers looking at different information. 
The cost of this uneasy compromise is high; it distorts the focus and 
composition of audit teams; yet it is less rigorous than other subject-
specific inspections by Ofsted, the GMC and other PSRBs for example. It 
also drives much of the over-preparation we have observed.  
6.27. The cost/benefit argument for DATs is much weaker than that for the core 
audit and we therefore propose that they should cease in their present 
form. 
6.28. We believe QAA could conduct Audit Trails (ATs), which might or might 
not be in a specific single discipline area, but would not include the 
vestiges of Subject Review that remain in DATs. ATs would be much 
lighter than DATs as implemented. They would not for example require a 
SED, or module boxes, or inspection of student work. 
6.29. QAA could also draw upon the subject-specific reviews by other agencies. 
There is already some co-operation of this kind, for example QAA does 
not do DATs in medical schools because of GMC review. This principle 
should be extended to all disciplines that have a rigorous external review, 
and these agencies should be asked to share their findings with QAA as 
appropriate. 
6.30. This change alone could reduce the total cost of inspection on the sector 
very significantly. 
 
 
Conclusion 6: It is too early to assess costs and benefits of TQI and NSS. 
6.31. It is too early to assess costs and benefits of TQI and NSS, except in a 
very preliminary way. We understand that these were part of a package 
negotiated at the demise of universal Subject Review, and so the sector 
has seen a benefit from their introduction. However, there is almost 
universal concern that this is an attempt to impose a ‘one size fits all’ 
approach, without taking adequate account of what institutions are already 
doing, or of potential unintended consequences of publishing summaries 
of reports that should be frank and uninhibited. 
6.32. There is a wide variation in the state of our sample institutions’ 
preparations for TQI, but our limited data suggests that this could be a 
costly initiative for the sector (£3m annually) for institutions, plus £1m 
central costs. It will be important to conduct a proper evaluation of these 
costs as soon as the position is clearer. 
 
 
Areas for further consideration 
6.33. The main focus of this report is to provide evidence on costs and benefits 
to inform the two groups which have been involved in steering the project. 
Our main findings and conclusions are encapsulated in the six conclusions 
discussed above.  
6.34. We have identified three areas where we hope the two steering groups will 
help to take forward further thinking with the aim of improving still further 
the balance of costs and benefits of external QA. 
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Area 1: Collaboration between inspecting agencies  
 
 It would further reduce costs for institutions if the general principle 
was adopted that only one publicly funded agency had the remit to 
lead reviews of provision in any area. For example, the QAA should 
be recognised as the lead agency for all review of institutional-level 
QA processes and systems.  
6.35. It would reduce costs and effort for HEIs if there were a clearer delineation 
of responsibilities for inspection, and a greater harmonisation of work 
between different agencies, following the principles we proposed in 
paragraph 6.8. For example, this could mean that: 
a. QAA would be recognised as the lead agency for all inspection of 
academic QA (fitness for award) including of all management and QA 
strategies, systems and processes at institution level. QAA would 
therefore in normal circumstances be the only body visiting institutions 
to review these aspects of QA. Other agencies which need to be 
assured about these central processes could be consulted by QAA 
about their requirements, but they should in general be satisfied with 
the level of assurance that is considered sufficient to safeguard UK 
academic awards. QAA should continue to share the results of its 
institutional audits with other agencies as appropriate. 
b. Other agencies would lead in the areas of subject-specific QA, as they 
do now. So Ofsted would continue to inspect ITT provision, the GMC 
medical schools etc, but these agencies would not also inspect central 
institutional M&QA processes (as some do at present), and QAA would 
not normally undertake subject specific reviews (except in the special 
circumstances where this is appropriate).  
 
 
Area 2: A greater developmental focus in Institutional Audit  
 
 We would like to see further consideration given to the best means 
by which QAA could introduce a developmental element into 
Institutional Audit.  
6.36. We suggest that QAA should use the opportunity of the end of the 
transition period to develop and include a much more specifically 
developmental element within the audit programme. As part of this, QAA 
should seek to facilitate a more open and self-critical approach in 
institutional SEDs, with corresponding non-judgmental and enhancement-
focused discussions and feedback to institutions, alongside the published 
confidence judgements. This will be a challenge, but it would be widely 
welcomed by institutions and will add further value to the process.  
6.37. We would leave it to QAA to decide how best to do this, consulting as 
appropriate, but we have in mind that institutional SEDs would comment 
much more specifically on enhancement, and audit teams would in turn 
address this in their reports. 
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Area 3: Reduction of avoidable costs in institutions  
 
 Institutions and inspecting agencies should work collaboratively to 
reduce the factors that encourage over-preparation by HEIs and 
which increase costs with no associated purpose or benefits. 
6.38. There is no single solution to this as we have discussed in the report. 
However, a number of measures could potentially help, including: 
• clearer guidance by QAA on what is really expected by auditors 
• consideration by QAA of the management of audit teams including the 
roles of the core auditor and the QAA audit secretary in advising 
institutions  
• our recommendation to cease DATs should help significantly 
• a more confident approach by institutions – helped perhaps by more 
effective sharing of good practice and experience of audit 
• agencies engaging constructively with institutions in developing 
protocols for use of electronic information (as the GMC is doing).   
 
 
Future steady state costs  
Academic QA and the QAF 
6.39. In extrapolating the costs of Institutional Audit under the QAF forward to a 
steady state cost post-2005 (shown in table 6), we have made the 
following assumptions: 
a. All 130 institutions will in future experience a full institutional audit 
once in six years.  
b. This audit will cost less than the first round of audits for two reasons. 
First, some of the costs experienced by the institutions in our sample 
were the ‘one-off’ costs of a first audit, or represented an avoidable 
element of ‘over-preparation’ which they will not incur in future years. 
We have assumed that on average the costs of each core 
institutional audit in the new cycle will be 85% of those incurred in 
2003/04 (saving 15%). Second, the DATs will be replaced by much 
lighter audit trails with no production of SEDs or module boxes 
involved. We believe that the costs of DATs will be reduced by 90% 
as a result of this change. 
c. During the six-year period, institutions will also have some contact 
with QAA which might or might not be as formal as a ‘mid-term 
review’. The costs of this will vary but on average could be equivalent 
to 5% of the costs of an audit (such as preparation of a brief review 
and update to/commentary on the SED and action plan, plus a visit). 
For a small sample of institutions, the costs will be higher as they will 
have a judgement of limited confidence and will have to undergo a 
programme of further review and re-audit within the first three years 
of the period. For these institutions, the cost of this review will be 
20% of the costs of an audit. We have assumed (conservatively) this 
will apply to 5% of institutions. 
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d. We have assumed that Developmental Engagements will cease, but 
have made an allowance for some developmental work during the 
six-year cycle. We have assumed that the total cost of this will be no 
more than 20% of the current cost of institutional audit, that is, an 
average of £35,000 per institution over the six-year cycle. 
6.40. The combined impact of all these assumed changes is shown in table 6. 
On this basis, the annual costs of a programme of equivalent Institutional 
Audits for the sector once the present transitional phase is completed 
would be approximately £5.0m per annum or an average of £38,000 per 
institution per year, compared with £17.5m for the sector and £135,000 
per institution during the transitional phase. This is a cost reduction of 
approximately 70% due to a combination of the ‘learning effect’, loss of 
DATs and DEs (partly off-set by ATs and the new developmental work); 
and the switch from a three-year to a six-year cycle.  
6.41. Total academic QA also includes collaborative audits, provision of 
auditors, and TQI. We have assumed that there will be no further separate 
programme of foundation degree reviews after 2005. 
6.42. The costs of collaborative audits will be much higher in the new cycle, as 
most of these slipped in timing. In this same cycle 35 institutions will have 
a collaborative audit (two had this during the transition period), which we 
assume will cost about 1.25 times the cost of an Institutional Audit. 
However, these are not a new element, as they were also part of the 
transitional phase. 
6.43. The combined cost of all these academic QA elements in the new six-year 
cycle is shown as £10.0m per annum for the sector or approximately 
£61,000 per annum for an institution without collaborative audit, and 
£98,000 for one with collaborative audit (an average of £77,000 per 
institution). 
6.44. This is a reduction at sector level of over 50% of the total annual cost of 
the QAF compared with the transitional period. For institutions without 
collaborative audit, it is a saving of 66%, while for the 37 institutions with 
collaborative audit; it is a saving of 40% over the costs experienced so far 
during the transitional period.   
6.45. These are very real reductions in costs. It must be noted that two of the 
significant elements in this projection are still uncertain: the costs of 
collaborative audit, and of TQI. However, we believe we have used 
relatively conservative assumptions on these, and so the overall reduction 
in costs is unlikely to be less than we have estimated. 
 
 
Professional QA 
6.46. Table 7 shows our projection of future steady state costs of professional 
QA. This is much simpler than the situation with academic QA in table 6. 
We have assumed some small cost reductions where these are expected 
(for Ofsted, Ofsted/ALI and Major Review, and for the GMC when the 
present pilot phase is over). This leads to a projection of the total future 
annual cost for HEIs of £151,000 per HEI and £19.7m for the sector. 
6.47. An interesting result of the changes in the QAF is that the relationship 
between academic and professional QA costs will be different in future. At 
present, the two are broadly equivalent at £20m each per year (see 
paragraph 6.10 and table B following). In the future steady state, the cost 
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of professional QA will be broadly twice that of academic QA due to the 
reduction in the latter from £19m to £10m.  
6.48. The combined impact of these various changes is shown in table B which 
summarises the forecast future steady state costs of all external QA in 
higher education.  
 
Table B: Forecast future steady state costs of external review on an 
annualised basis  
 
 Average per 
HEI  £000s 
England 
£m 
Academic QA QAF(6-year cycle)   
Institutional Audit 32 4.2 
Developmental work 6 0.76 
Provision of auditors for QAA 5 0.67 
Collaborative audit 10 1.3 
TQI/NSS 24 3.1 
Total academic QA (QAF) 77  10.0m 
   
Professional QA   
Ofsted inspection of ITT - 3.0 
GMC review of medicine - 1.3 
Review of health provision - 4.2 
Inspection of FE in HE - 1.3 
Inspection by PSRBs (excl health) - 9.9 
Total professional QA 151 19.7m 
Total cost of external QA 228 29.7m 
 
Note: the ‘average’ figure for costs of collaborative audit is actually a composite of 
zero for most HEIs, and £37,000 for the 37 HEIs which will have a collaborative audit. 
The total academic QA costs per HEI therefore vary between £61,000 (without 
collaborative audit) and £98,000 (with collaborative audit). In other cases where HEIs 
have (even wider) variations in processes, we have not included an average cost per 
HEI. Full details are in tables 6 and 7. 
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List of Abbreviations 
 
ALI   Adult Learning Inspectorate 
AMBA  Association of Masters in Business Administration 
AT   Audit trail 
BRTF  Better Regulation Task Force 
CNAA  Council for National Academic Awards 
CVCP  Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals 
DAT  Discipline Audit Trail 
DE   Developmental Engagement 
DfES  Department for Education and Skills 
FD   Foundation degree 
FE   Further education 
GMC  General Medical Council 
HEFCE  Higher Education Funding Council for England 
HEI  Higher Education Institution 
HEQC  Higher Education Quality Council 
HERO  Higher Education Research Opportunities portal 
HERRG  Higher Education Regulation Review Group 
HESA  Higher Education Statistics Agency 
HMI  Her Majesty’s Inspectorate 
HPC  Health Professions Council 
IA   Institutional Audit 
IBMS  Institute of Biomedical Science 
ITT   Initial Teacher Training 
JACS  Joint Academic Coding System 
M&QA  Management and quality assurance 
NMC  Nursing and Midwifery Council 
NSS  National Student Survey 
NUS  National Union of Students 
Ofsted  Office for Standards in Education 
PGCE  Postgraduate Certificate in Education 
PSRB  Professional and Statutory Regulatory Body 
PSX(I) Inspection sub committee of the Commons Committee for 
Public Services and Expenditure 
QA   Quality assurance 
QAA  Quality Assurance Agency 
QABME  Quality Assurance of Basic Medical Education 
QAF  Quality Assurance Framework 
QE   Quality enhancement 
SCITT  School-Centred Initial Teacher Training 
SCOP  Standing Conference of Principals 
SED  Self-Evaluation Document 
TQI  Teaching Quality Information 
TRAC  Transparent Approach to Costing 
TTA  Teacher Training Agency 
 
